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TAX LAW’S MIGRATION 
SHAYAK SARKAR* 
Abstract: Tax law punishes poor foreigners. Although the Supreme Court struck 
down nineteenth-century state laws taxing migrants upon entry, the tax system 
determines who deserves a place, and what sort of place, within our borders. The 
tax system’s emergency relief programs may deprive otherwise needy nonciti-
zens, giving migrants a lesser place. This Article sheds light on this phenome-
non—“tax law’s migration”—engaging two connections between immigration 
and tax law. First, this Article uses the term to explain the tax system’s long tradi-
tion of policing migrants. From colonial tax incentives for selective migration to 
joint tax-immigration worksite enforcement, tax law crystallizes financial wel-
come for some and hostility for others. Immigration status-based inequalities 
give rise to constitutional litigation that constrains, but does not extinguish, tax 
law’s policing of migrants. Second, this Article describes how migration and mo-
bility rights are used to police tax compliance. Tax law fashions penalties through 
the revocation of driver’s licenses and passports. A striking contrast emerges from 
comparing (often-affluent) citizen tax noncompliers with noncitizens. Remaining 
in the country becomes the penalty for those who may take it for granted. Yet, 
remaining is also the very privilege denied to noncitizens who may seek little 
else. Reckoning with tax law’s migration requires tracing the bureaucratization of 
ethnic and racial disregard and the abandonment of economically vulnerable mi-
grants during emergencies. This Article argues that rather than reflexively ap-
proving tax law’s migration, we should scrutinize it. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court warned that state 
tax laws interfered with migration. New York, for example, raised a tax on 
oceanic migrants for “hospital moneys,”1 and Massachusetts supplemented its 
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 1 Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 403 (1849) (opinion of McLean, J.). “Hospital moneys” is 
funding for marine hospitals. Id. To clarify this Article’s use of the words “migrant” and “immigrant,” 
the latter is often used to imply permanence. See, e.g., JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA, EX MEX: FROM MI-
GRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS 37 (2007) (describing the “metamorphosis from seasonal [Mexican] migrants 
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foreign passenger tax by requiring a bond for any “lunatic, idiot, maimed, 
aged, or infirm person.”2 In the famous Passenger Cases challenging these 
laws, the Supreme Court struck down the taxes.3 Distinguishing the impermis-
sible passenger taxes from more permissible state health policies, the Court 
worried of “the unfortunate immigrant, before he arrives at his destined home, 
be[ing] made a pauper by oppressive duties on his transit.”4 
Nearly two hundred years later, as pressing public health concerns surface 
anew, tax law retains its power over migration. That connection goes beyond 
the Supreme Court’s pithy reminder in Graham v. Richardson that noncitizens 
pay taxes just as citizens do, and enjoy constitutional protections in the tax sys-
tem and beyond.5 
Yet, the connection between tax and immigration receives rather short 
shrift, despite the attention paid to these early cases’ constitutional import. 
Scholars peripherally note tax law’s role in the American immigration system, 
but the connection rarely occupies the center of academic pursuit.6 When in-
quiries do center the connection, they are narrowly focused. For example, 
some focus on how some of the world’s wealthiest people denaturalize to pro-
                                                                                                                           
to permanent settlers, or immigrants”). Legally, the American immigration system contains both immi-
grant and nonimmigrant visas, the latter often being short-term. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)–(16), (26) 
(distinguishing between immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, as well as between immigrant and 
nonimmigrant noncitizens). Despite a connotation of permanence, however, immigrants may not be as 
distinct from nonimmigrant migrants as statutes might suggest. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 70 
(2d Cir. 2012) (“[A]lthough plaintiffs had to indicate that they did not intend to stay here permanently 
to obtain their visas, the truth is that many (if not all) actually harbor a hope (a dual intention) that 
some day they will acquire the right to stay here permanently. The BIA and the State Department both 
recognize this doctrine of dual intent . . . .”). 
 2 Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 456 (opinion of Grier, J.). 
 3 Id. at 572–73. 
 4 Id. at 461 (opinion of Grier, J.). 
 5 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding “that a state statute that denies welfare benefits to [lawful 
foreign nationals] and one that denies them to [foreign nationals] who have not resided in the United 
States for a specified number of years violate [sic] the Equal Protection Clause”). In that 1971 case, 
the Court struck down a state welfare statute foisting a discriminatory residency requirement upon 
legally residing foreign nationals. Id. (describing how noncitizens “‘may live within a state for many 
years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the state’” (quoting Leger v. Sailer, 
321 F. Supp. 250, 253 (E.D. Pa. 1970))). 
 6 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 667 (2005) (characterizing the Passenger Cases as concerning “head taxes” 
and about foreign commerce rather than immigration per se). While chronicling a number of early tax 
laws, Abrams ultimately focuses on unearthing the underappreciated significance of the Page Law that 
challenged the immigration of Chinese women. Id. at 643; see also Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Stand-
ing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 378 n.13 (2004) (noting that the Passenger Cases 
were about tax statutes but focusing instead on their role in establishing plenary power); Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 621 
(2008) (noting only in passing the presence of taxes in various Supreme Court decisions and how 
perceptions of immigrant tax contributions may be shaping sub-federal regulation). 
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tect their wealth from the broad scope of U.S. taxation.7 Others analyze Su-
preme Court cases that address how tax felonies can lead to deportation of 
even legal permanent residents.8 Even as scholars generally observe that the 
government taxes undocumented immigrants, despite excluding them from 
many public benefits,9 they tend to overlook the intricate connections between 
tax and immigration law. 
Federal tax law’s treatment of race contrasts with its treatment of immigra-
tion status. Since the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, the pre-
decessor to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has long refused to ask about a 
taxpayer’s race.10 Early local and state taxes intentionally discriminated against 
racial minorities, leading to lawsuits as late as the end of the twentieth century.11 
Scholars acknowledge that formal colorblindness has replaced this system, even 
as disparate and discriminatory impacts persist.12 Yet tax law need not be, nor 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See, e.g., Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 170–71 (2016) (discussing 
the high-profile departure of Facebook co-founder Eduardo Saverin). See generally 26 U.S.C. 
§ 911(d)(1) (defining a “qualified individual” under federal tax law); Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship 
and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
1289, 1292 (2011) (assessing citizenship-based taxation). 
 8 See Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 480 (2012); Joshua D. Blank, Collateral Compliance, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 724 (2014) (noting how “[i]t may appear unusual to tax practitioners and tax 
scholars that the Kawashimas’ additional, nonmonetary sanction for tax noncompliance was levied by 
an agency other than the IRS”); Tessa Davis, The Tax-Immigration Nexus, 94 DENV. L. REV. 195, 197 
(2017) (using citizenship theory to question Kawashima’s assumptions and to analyze its implica-
tions). 
 9 Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and With-
out Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 27–29 (2006) (providing a hypothetical of an unau-
thorized worker’s tax liability); Shayak Sarkar, Capital Controls as Migrant Controls, 109 CALIF. L. 
REV. 799, 801–02 (2021) (discussing how migrants confront Social Security entitlement and payment 
restrictions). 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Form 1040, INTERNAL REVENUE BUREAU (1913), http://www.
taxhistory.org/thp/1040forms.nsf/WebByYear/1913/$file/1040_1913.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RXT-
R3RC]; Form 1040, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY–INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (2020), https://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK8B-KRB8]. See generally Jeremy Bearer-Friend, 
Should the IRS Know Your Race? The Challenge of Colorblind Tax Data, 73 TAX L. REV. 1 (2019) 
(chronicling and problematizing this historical practice). 
 11 See, e.g., Williams v. City of Dothan, 745 F.2d 1406, 1408, 1414–15 (11th Cir. 1984) (revers-
ing a grant of summary judgment against minority residents challenging tax assessments in Dothan, 
Alabama “to pay for a street paving and sewer improvement project in their neighborhood” on an 
equal protection theory). The plaintiff viably argued that the city contributed a lower percentage of 
municipal funds to this project than past, comparable projects located in predominantly white areas. 
Id. at 1415; see also Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21, 23 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the Tax Injunc-
tion Act and the availability of a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy precluded availability of § 1983 
relief to Black property owners, who alleged that the 1966 increases in their property tax assessments 
were the sole result of racially discriminatory retaliation for the taxpayers’ prior demonstrations). 
 12 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 
799 (2007) (arguing that support for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is conditional on it being 
“‘properly’ raced”); Leo P. Martinez, Latinos and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Primer 
for the New Administration, 20 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 101, 111–14 (2017) (discussing how tax poli-
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is it, blind to immigration status, however correlated with ethnic and racial 
identity.13 
The subjects of immigration and tax enforcement also reflect a study in 
contrasts. The IRS’s sights often lie on lucrative, high-income citizens, as it 
plans face-to-face visits with delinquent taxpayers.14 In contrast with the IRS’s 
professed concerns about the high-earners atop America’s economic pyramid,15 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) focuses on noncitizens, particu-
larly those without lawful immigration status.16 These noncitizens struggle in 
                                                                                                                           
cy interacts with the Latinx community); see also Bernadette Atuahene, Predatory Cities, 108 CALIF. 
L. REV. 107, 178–79 (2020) (discussing evidence of racially discriminatory property taxes throughout 
American cities); Shayak Sarkar & Josh Rosenthal, Exclusionary Taxation, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 619, 631 (2018) (describing how property tax limitations, like California’s Proposition 13, can 
result in racially disparate impacts in violation of the Fair Housing Act). 
 13 Martinez, supra note 12, at 111–14 (observing how conversations about tax policy for those 
without lawful status often unfortunately drive conversations about tax policy for the much broader 
Latinx community); see infra Sections I.A–B, II.B. 
 14 Alan K. Ota, IRS Division Head Sets Sights on High-Income Nonfilers, LAW360 TAX AUTH. (Feb. 
11, 2020), https://www.law360.com/tax-authority/articles/1242936/irs-division-head-sets-sights-on-
high-income-nonfilers [https://perma.cc/92X7-RRB2] (interviewing Eric Hylton, IRS Commissioner); 
Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Increases Visits to High-Income Taxpayers Who Haven’t 
Filed Tax Returns (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-increases-visits-to-high-income-
taxpayers-who-havent-filed-tax-returns [https://perma.cc/K8EZ-PMLG]. To be clear, high-income tax-
payers are distinct from the ultrawealthy taxpayers, often billionaires. See Jesse Eisinger & Paul Kiel, 
The IRS Tried to Take on the Ultrawealthy. It Didn’t Go Well., PRO-PUBLICA (Apr. 5, 2019), https://
www.propublica.org/article/ultrawealthy-taxes-irs-internal-revenue-service-global-high-wealth-audits 
[https://perma.cc/ZC3L-4G8C] (narrating how lobbyists and Republicans in Congress undercut the 
IRS’s emerging “approach to taking on the superwealthy”). 
 15 Some attention has also been given to the distinct phenomenon of how the IRS unfairly polices 
poorer taxpayers, including EITC and Child Tax Credit claimants. See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 
2020 PURPLE BOOK 12 (2019) (noting how “[t]he IRS does not provide sufficient time for taxpayers to 
resubmit rejected returns” and how “[t]axpayers in vulnerable populations that use free tax return prepa-
ration services, such as the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance and Tax Counseling for the Elderly pro-
grams, may face delays in scheduling a time to return for assistance” (emphasis omitted)); see also Darla 
Mercado, The IRS Delayed Refunds for 275,000 Taxpayers Last Year. Here’s Why, CNBC (Jan. 15, 
2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/15/the-irs-delayed-refunds-for-275000-taxpayers-last-year-
heres-why.html [https://perma.cc/6NCD-9YF8] (“‘If refunds for lower-income people are being held 
up as an enforcement matter, that’s not even where the revenue savings are . . . .’” (quoting Steve 
Wamhoff, Director of Federal Tax Policy at the Institute on Taxation and Policy)). 
 16 See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FIS-
CAL YEAR 2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 7 fig.5 (2019) (noting the in-
creased number of people in detention from 2017–2019). A recent U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) Director declared that ICE is “ready to just perform their mission which is to go and 
find and detain and then deport . . . .” Matthew Rozsa, Ken Cuccinelli Says Donald Trump Is Ready to 
Deport 1 Million Undocumented Immigrants, SALON (July 7, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/07/
07/ken-cuccinelli-says-donald-trump-is-ready-to-deport-1-million-undocumented-immigrants/ 
[https://perma.cc/C3MK-XQTJ] (quoting Ken Cuccinelli, acting USCIS Director, from an interview 
on Face the Nation). 
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the pyramid’s shadows.17 Immigrants who live without lawful status describe 
beliefs about the immigration system’s illegitimacy motivating their covert 
migrations and self-understanding.18 Yet, when migrants violate American 
immigration law, many still take pains to comply with the law generally, with 
millions filing income taxes.19 
This Article analyzes how tax law and immigration law leverage one an-
other to shape people’s economic and spatial freedoms. I use the term “tax 
law’s migration” to describe two facets of their interplay. First, the tax system 
has long operated in service of migration control, a connection that litigation is 
unlikely to sever. Centuries ago, tax law reflected America’s long-held bipolar 
attitudes towards migration. On one hand, it reflected the migration concerns 
underlying the state statutes struck down by the Passenger Cases. On the other 
hand, these laws reflected the desire for new economic revenue through crea-
tive schemes to tax those deemed “foreign.”20 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See generally Sherrie A. Kossoudji & Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, Coming Out of the Shadows: 
Learning About Legal Status and Wages from the Legalized Population, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 598, 623 
(2002) (arguing that legislation providing legal status for formerly undocumented workers brought 
them “out of the shadows” and higher economic returns to their education); George J. Borjas, The 
Earnings of Undocumented Immigrants 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23236, 
2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23236 [https://perma.cc/H685-UNQ7] (noting that the “age-
earnings profiles of undocumented workers lies far below that of legal immigrants and of native 
workers”). 
 18 Emily Ryo, Through the Back Door: Applying Theories of Legal Compliance to Illegal Immi-
gration During the Chinese Exclusion Era, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 109, 127 (2006) (arguing that 
“widespread belief among the Chinese that the exclusion laws lacked social and moral legitimacy 
likely facilitated their willingness to violate the exclusion laws”). 
 19 See generally MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK & ABIGAIL F. KOLKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
IN11376, NONCITIZENS AND ELIGIBILITY FOR THE 2020 RECOVERY REBATES 3 (2020) (describing 
the nearly four million Form 1040 tax returns filed in 2017 that included at least one individual tax-
payer identification number (ITIN)—a social security number substitute used by certain noncitizens—
and collectively contained 7.5 million ITINs); Mae M. Ngai, No Human Being Is Illegal, 34 WOM-
EN’S STUD. Q. 291, 291 (2006) (arguing that, according to some social surveys, immigrants are gener-
ally more law-abiding than the U.S.-born population); Emily Ryo, Legal Attitudes of Immigrant De-
tainees, 51 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 99, 109, 115 (2017) (describing an in-person survey of immigrant 
detainees in Southern California where, whereas only a minority “of the detainees believe that people 
should accept the decisions of U.S. immigration authorities,” a majority “believe that people should 
obey the law even if they disagreed with the law”); Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More Compliance: 
Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 628–29 (2015) (describing how “beliefs 
about the lack of system legitimacy form a powerful normative account that might enable otherwise 
law-abiding individuals to violate U.S. immigration laws”). 
 20 Public survey polls conducted in 1965 with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) revealed a country divided on the issue of immigration while nonetheless agreeing that it was 
not “the most important problem facing the nation.” Andrew Kohut, From the Archives: In ’60s, 
Americans Gave Thumbs-Up to Immigration Law That Changed the Nation, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 
20, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/20/in-1965-majority-of-americans-favored-
immigration-and-nationality-act-2/ [https://perma.cc/HP8B-N58R]. Currently, a much larger percent-
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Tax law’s migration includes a second facet: the employment of migration 
controls, both local and transnational, for tax enforcement.21 Simply put, a tax-
payer’s right to move freely is conditioned on tax compliance.22 Limits on 
movement range from driver’s license revocations and passport denials all the 
way to removal from the United States.23 Even as tax enforcement’s penalties 
differentiate between citizens and noncitizens, they generally seek compliance 
by threatening the right to move freely.24 
This second facet of tax law’s migration leads to a striking consequence. 
High-income, tax-delinquent citizens face national confinement, precluding 
their ability to journey beyond our borders.25 In contrast, poor, tax-delinquent 
noncitizens may be banished beyond those very borders, unable to remain 
within them legally.26 Remaining becomes both the penalty for those who may 
take it for granted as well as the privilege denied to those who might dream of 
little else.27 Tax noncompliance leaves both citizens and noncitizens with less 
ability to steer their lives in the directions they desire. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain the historical role of 
taxation in policing migration from colonization to modern day. The taxation 
                                                                                                                           
age of Americans support “legal” immigration than did at the time of the INA’s passage. Id.; see also 
infra Part I (describing political and social tensions arising from migration to America centuries ago). 
 21 For one set of perspectives on how migration and mobility may be distinct, see generally MO-
BILITY AND MIGRATION CHOICES: THRESHOLDS TO CROSSING BORDERS (Martin van der Velde & 
Ton van Naerssen eds., 2015). The European Union has entered into mobility partnerships with some 
countries avoiding the language of migration. See Migration & Home Affs., Mobility Partnerships, Visa 
Facilitation and Readmission Agreements, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/mobility-partnerships-visa-facilitation-and-
readmission-agreements_en [https://perma.cc/S84L-WSQX]. 
 22 Joshua Blank provides discussion of the mobility restrictions but examines “collateral conse-
quences” in tax law more generally, as distinct from “traditional monetary tax penalties.” Blank, supra 
note 8, at 725. Blank’s analysis also predates the 2015 law allowing for passport revocation and refers 
to the idea as only a nascent “proposal.” Id. at 736; see infra notes 230–234 and accompanying text 
(discussing a federal passport revocation law that applies to delinquent taxpayers). 
 23 See infra Section III.A (describing penalties for taxpayer noncompliance, disaggregated by 
citizenship). 
 24 See infra Section III.A. 
 25 See infra Section III.A. At times, “[s]tate and federal tax authorities have . . . extended [amnes-
ty] to taxpayers who voluntarily disclose violations and pay penalties.” Miriam H. Baer, Reconceptu-
alizing the Whistleblower’s Dilemma, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2215, 2273 (2017). The penalties, how-
ever, can be considerable. In United States v. Gabella, the taxpayer paid penalties that were an order 
of magnitude larger than the restitution. No. 14-CR-207, 2014 WL 7338797, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 
2014) (noting how “Gabella has paid a civil penalty fine of $3,140,346.35 and $239,012 in restitu-
tion”). 
 26 See infra Part III. 
 27 See generally JOSEPH H. CARENS, IMMIGRANTS AND THE RIGHT TO STAY 17 (2010) (“Experi-
ences accumulate: birthdays and braces, tones of voice and senses of humor, public parks and corner 
stores, the shape of the streets and the way the sun shines through the leaves, the smell of flowers and 
the sounds of local accents, the look of the stars and the taste of the air—all that gives life its purpose 
and texture. We sink deep roots . . . .”).  
2216 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2209 
of migrant-settlers and natives raised questions of who should bear tax bur-
dens, and more broadly, who should belong. This history anticipates tax law’s 
continued interactions with immigration law. 
Accordingly, in Part II, I analyze tax law’s policing of poor migrants in 
two modern case studies: the tax system’s emergency relief during an econom-
ic crisis and joint enforcement between tax and immigration authorities. The 
initial pandemic relief bill sidelined mixed immigration status families, penal-
izing households for a single member’s immigration actions, no matter how 
perfect their tax compliance.28 Lawfully present family members raised consti-
tutional challenges that remain unresolved, even as subsequent rounds of pan-
demic relief narrowed the exclusion.29 Beyond pandemic relief, I document the 
express joining of the IRS and the Department of Homeland Security in immi-
gration enforcement, including unconstitutional excesses.30 Even if constitu-
tional lawsuits surrounding the relief exclusions and workplace “raids” con-
strain tax law’s migration at the edges, they will not dismantle its core. 
I then proceed in Part III to discuss migration penalties for taxpayer non-
compliance, first for noncitizens and then for citizens and taxpayers generally, 
before turning to the migration benefits of tax compliance. Driver’s licenses 
have long been denied to those in state arrears, and federal law recently 
bridged the Department of Treasury’s power to collect tax debts with the De-
partment of State’s power to issue and revoke passports. Beyond grounding 
high-flying tax delinquents, tax compliance may affect the less affluent, in-
cluding through comprehensive immigration reform proposals that condition 
legalization on tax payments.31 
In Part IV, I explain normatively why we should be concerned about tax 
law’s migration, particularly tax law’s policing of poor migrants. Excluding 
broad classes of migrants from emergency economic relief is costly, legally 
anomalous, and unnecessarily restrictive. Additionally, conscripting tax author-
ities to police migrants undermines taxation’s focus on revenue. 
I. HISTORIC TAXATION TO SHAPE MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS 
People move in search of better lives—and more favorable tax laws.32 
American tax law has long encouraged some types of migration—namely Eu-
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra Section II.A. 
 29 See infra Section II.A. 
 30 See infra Section II.B. 
 31 Infra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 32 Cf. JOAN YOUNGMAN, A GOOD TAX 211 (2016) (describing how property tax laws that limit 
assessment increases may attract homeowners but also lock them in and create unintended mobility 
disincentives); Scott R. Baker, Stephanie Johnson & Lorenz Kueng, Shopping for Lower Sales Tax 
Rates, 13 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 209 (2021) (analyzing high-frequency retail scanner data 
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ropean—but not others, including migration by (even wealthy) Latin Ameri-
cans and Chinese nationals. In modern times, tax law has receded from ex-
pressly distinguishing potential immigrants by ethnicity and national origin.33 
Although foreign businessmen, and their “peons” or “serfs” were once per-
ceived to threaten American interests,34 America now offers a “golden visa” 
(EB-5) for the wealthy in exchange for bringing capital and producing domes-
tic jobs.35 Even in administrations uniquely focused on immigration enforce-
ment, investors in these golden visa programs are excepted from enforce-
ment.36 This Part traces the historic intersections of migration and taxation, 
beginning in Section A with a discussion of tax laws in the early American col-
onies.37 Then, in Section B, it traces tax laws in the early territories, specifical-
ly California.38 Finally, in Section C, it considers current tax regimes.39 
A. Colonies of Migrant Taxation 
Tax exemptions and eliminations were initially designed to encourage the 
migration of European settlers. In the seventeenth century, the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony Charter exempted settlers from English import customs, subsidies, 
and royal taxes for twenty-one years.40 The Dutch West India (DWI) Company, 
which managed the New Netherland colony after 1645, was also concerned 
                                                                                                                           
to show cross-border shopping responses to sales tax rates). See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (“The consumer-voter may be 
viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods.”). 
 33 But see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 34 STACEY L. SMITH, FREEDOM’S FRONTIER: CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE OVER UNFREE 
LABOR, EMANCIPATION, AND RECONSTRUCTION 88–89 (2013). 
 35 Immigration Act of 1990 § 121(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5); Adab v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 
Servs., No. 15-248, 2017 WL 4358686, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2017) (providing a historical overview 
of EB-5 visas). 
 36 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 10014, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,441, 23,442 (Apr. 22, 2020) (“The suspen-
sion and limitation on entry pursuant to section 1 of this proclamation shall not apply to . . . any alien 
applying for a visa to enter the United States pursuant to the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program 
. . . .”); Sarah Pierce, Jessica Bolter & Andrew Selee, U.S. Immigration Policy Under Trump: Deep 
Changes and Lasting Impacts, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 15 (July 2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.
org/sites/default/files/publications/TCMTrumpSpring2018-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XGP-RW52] 
(arguing that “[n]o administration in modern U.S. history has placed such a high priority on immigra-
tion policy or had an almost exclusive focus on restricting immigration flows” as the Trump Admin-
istration). 
 37 See infra notes 40–50 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 51–78 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 79–100 and accompanying text. 
 40 ISRAEL MAUDUIT, A SHORT VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
BAY, WITH RESPECT TO THEIR CHARTERS AND CONSTITUTION 81–82 (London, J. Wilkie 1774). 
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about the effect of taxation on migration.41 The Amsterdam Department of that 
company feared that a proposed tax on beaver pelts “would cause a [settler] 
depopulation of the country and deprive us of the means to bring emigrants 
over.”42 For that reason, the Department overturned the tax.43 Such migration 
policies were portrayed in simple terms: “the expectation of gain is the greatest 
spur to induce people to go thither.”44 Beaver pelts became an unlikely source 
of broader migrant settler-taxation challenges.45 
The logistics of, and disinterest in, paying also made colonial taxation 
challenging. Accounts formally maintained in pound sterling ignored the reali-
ty that few British coins or precious metals circulated in the British American 
colonies.46 Colonial legislatures permitted people to pay taxes in animal skins, 
barley, and even pails of milk, though wily taxpayers often submitted low-
grade or spoiled commodities, leading to reforms in what could satisfy tax ob-
ligations.47 Even as colonies like New Netherland attempted to minimize tax 
burdens, settlers still “reluctantly paid taxes, and rarely in full.”48 Ultimately, 
tax frustrations helped forge a new solidarity among British emigrants in the 
Thirteen Colonies, as the disputes over the Stamp Act and other tax measures 
fueled the American Revolutionary War.49 Revolting over taxation, migrants 
forged a country out of colonies.50 
                                                                                                                           
 41 For a translation of the charter of the Dutch West India Company under which New Netherland 
was founded and administered, see VAN RENSSELAER BOWIER MANUSCRIPTS 86–115 (A.J.F. van 
Laer ed. & trans., 1908). 
 42 Harold C. Syrett, Private Enterprise in New Amsterdam, 11 WM. & MARY Q. 536, 544 (1954) 
(quoting XIV DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 194 
(E.B. O’Callaghan ed., Albany1853–1887)). 
 43 Id. (noting how the power-sharing partner in the Council of Nineteen imposed and withdrew 
taxes). 
 44 Id. (quoting LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF NEW NETHERLAND, I638–1674, at 149–50 (E.B. 
O’Callaghan ed., Albany1868)). 
 45 JAAP JACOBS, THE COLONY OF NEW NETHERLAND: A DUTCH SETTLEMENT IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 11–12 (2009). Although seemingly obscure by modern standards, the signifi-
cance of taxation in the fur trade, including but not limited to beavers, persisted well into the nine-
teenth century. See generally James L. Clayton, The Growth and Economic Significance of the Ameri-
can Fur Trade, 1790–1890, 40 MINN. HIST. 210, 218 (1966) (“All told, almost $40,000,000 was add-
ed to the United States economy by the fur seal industry during these two decades, [1870–1891] 
. . . .”). 
 46 ALVIN RABUSHKA, TAXATION IN COLONIAL AMERICA 157 (2008) (discussing the use of wam-
pum in the fur trade); Justin duRivage & Claire Priest, The Stamp Act and the Political Origins of 
American Legal and Economic Institutions, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 898 (2015) (describing how 
“North Americans were perpetually short on currency, particularly the hard and sterling currency 
necessary to pay . . . duties”). 
 47 RABUSHKA, supra note 46, at 158. 
 48 Id. at 206. 
 49 JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 82–87, 90 (2018). 
 50 duRivage & Priest, supra note 46, at 875–76 (describing how scholarly chronicling of the 
American Revolution focuses on “ideological and constitutional objections to ‘taxation without repre-
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B. Taxation and Migration Beyond the Colonies 
The colonies evolved into the United States, but tax continued to shape 
migration and migrants within American territory. The early need for state tax 
revenue tempered anti-migrant sentiment and also reflected migrant distinc-
tions based on nationality. 
California’s foreign miners’ tax reflects the often-ambivalent reception of 
migrant workers: resentful of their presence and solicitous of their money.51 In 
the nineteenth century, Thomas Jefferson Green, a state legislator who spon-
sored the bill that created the University of California, argued that foreign min-
ing interests, described by another as “‘men of ease and urbanity’ from Chile, 
Mexico, and Peru,” with their “imported ‘“peons’” or “‘serfs,’”” threatened 
American interests.52 Green introduced the foreign miners’ tax to preserve 
mining wealth for Californians, the purportedly “rightful owners” of the 
mines.53 
Green prevailed in establishing a twenty-dollar monthly capitation tax (in 
other words, per individual) upon all foreign miners.54 The original tax risked 
bloodshed between armed U.S. citizens and a mélange of French and Latin-
American miners, with the foreigners paying the taxes or facing violence.55 
Green’s racist goal through the foreign miners’ tax was to “exploit” nonciti-
zens, “rather than expel them.”56 Ultimately, thousands of French and Latin 
Americans departed the mining town of Sonora, demonstrating how tax policy 
(and its violent enforcement) could undo migration.57 
After the migrant exodus, California’s fiscal exigencies once again de-
manded migration to support commerce and tax revenue, leading the new state 
                                                                                                                           
sentation’” but arguing that much of that scholarship “has largely overlooked . . . [the] particular kinds 
of colonial activities” taxed). 
 51 See, e.g., THOMAS J. GREEN, REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, ON AN “ACT FOR 
THE BETTER REGULATION OF THE MINES, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF FOREIGN MINERS” 3–4 (1850) 
(describing frustrations against foreign miners). 
 52 SMITH, supra note 34, at 88–90 (referencing a quote from U.S. Consul Thomas O. Larkin). 
 53 Id. at 90. The Californians had themselves come to control the mines through conquest. As one 
Chilean industrialist bluntly put it, these mines were “bought from Mexico with Yankee blood.” Id. at 
91; see SUCHENG CHAN, THIS BITTERSWEET SOIL: THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE, 
1860–1910, at 63–66 (1986) (arguing that the foreign miner’s tax may have been invoked to justify 
violence against miners). 
 54 SUSAN LEE JOHNSON, ROARING CAMP: THE SOCIAL WORLD OF THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH 
322 (2000). 
 55 Sucheng Chan, A People of Exceptional Character: Ethnic Diversity, Nativism, and Racism in 
the California Gold Rush, 79 CAL. HIST. 44, 63–64 (2000). 
 56 Leonard Pitt, The Beginnings of Nativism in California, 30 PAC. HIST. REV. 23, 28 (1961) 
(quoting THOMAS J. GREEN, JOURNAL OF THE TEXIAN EXPEDITION AGAINST MIER 269 (New York, 
Harper & Bros. 1845)) (“Green . . . had once written that he could ‘maintain a better stomach at the 
killing of a Mexican than at the killing’ of a louse.”). 
 57 Chan, supra note 55, at 65. 
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to lower its incredibly high original rate.58 The mass noncitizen departures 
tanked the profits of American citizen entrepreneurs, from local landowners to 
those selling crowbars to the miners, leading them to organize a campaign to 
“secure a policy of ‘fair play’ for foreigners.”59 After the repeal of the original 
1850 twenty-dollar monthly capitation tax, the legislature introduced an 1852 
tax at one-seventh of the rate—a mere three dollars monthly.60 The specters of 
violence and mass emigration led to a careful recalibration of the tax rates. 
Even as the need for tax revenue weighed against migrant expulsion, tax 
law began to distinguish among migrants, targeting Chinese people.61 Califor-
nia tax law, for example, identified Chinese migrants indirectly, leveraging a 
nineteenth-century distinction that disallowed individuals of Chinese ancestry 
from obtaining citizenship.62 Governor Leland Stanford advocated for migra-
tion restrictions rooted in his racist distaste for Chinese migrants, whom he 
referred to as the “dregs of [Asia’s] population.”63 Yet, the Joint Select Com-
mittee of the California Legislature opposed migration restrictions and empha-
sized Chinese tax contributions.64 In rejecting Governor Stanford’s xenophobic 
position, the Committee argued that “instead of driving them out of the State, 
bounties might be offered them.”65 Dividing the racist Governor from the fi-
                                                                                                                           
 58 See California Admission Day September 9, 1850, CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION, 
https://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_id=23856 [https://perma.cc/8CAR-MGPA] (noting that “California 
became the 31st state on September 9, 1850”); see also Mark Kanazawa, Immigration, Exclusion, and 
Taxation: Anti-Chinese Legislation in Gold Rush California, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 779, 786 & fig.1 
(2005) (analyzing foreign miners’ tax revenue as a fraction of state GDP, and noting how it hovered 
around, and often exceeded, ten percent). 
 59 Pitt, supra note 56, at 30. 
 60 “In 1853 [this tax was] raised . . . to “four dollars per month” for all foreign miners. Kanazawa, 
supra note 58, at 784–85 (first citing Foreign Miners’ Tax Act of 1850, ch. 97, 1850 Cal. Stat. 221, 
221–23 (repealed 1851); then citing Act of Mar. 14, 1851, ch. 108, 1851 Cal. Stat. 424, 424; then 
citing Foreign Miners’ Tax Act of 1852, ch. 37, 1852 Cal. Stat. 84, 85 (repealed 1853); and then citing 
Act of Mar. 30, 1853, ch. 44, 1853 Cal. Stat. 62, 63 (amended 1855)). 
 61 Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The President and Immigration Feder-
alism, 68 FLA. L. REV. 101, 119 (2016) (describing how in the mid-nineteenth century, “the policies 
of several states stood in as immigration policy for a nation that had few federal immigration laws” 
and how “[o]n the West Coast, those regulations took on a strident anti-immigrant, anti-Chinese 
tone”). 
 62 Act of Apr. 30, 1855, ch. 174, 1855 Cal. Stat. 216, 216–217 (repealed 1856). 
 63 ELMER CLARENCE SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 43–44 
(1991) (“Asia, with her numberless millions, sends to our shores the dregs of her population. . . . 
There can be no doubt but that the presence among us of numbers of degraded and distinct people 
must exercise a deleterious influence upon the superior race, and to a certain extent, repel desirable 
immigration.” (quoting Leland Stanford, Governor of Cal., Inaugural Address (Jan. 10, 1862), in S. 
JOURNAL, 13th Sess. 98–102 (Cal. 1862)). 
 64 Id. at 44 (citing generally to the Appendix to the Journals of the State and Assembly (1862)). 
 65 Id. (citing generally to the Appendix to the Journals of the State and Assembly (1862)). 
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nancially-motivated Legislature, tax law debates captured how Chinese immi-
gration splintered California’s political branches.66 
Localities also invoked tax revenue realities to defend the presence of 
Chinese migrants in California. As one nineteenth-century San Francisco 
newspaper put it: “Were it not for the taxes paid by the Chinese, the credit of 
nearly every mining county would now be verging on bankruptcy.”67 An inland 
California newspaper similarly noted how “the taxes at present derived from 
[Chinese migrant workers] are a necessity to the state.”68 The necessity of tax 
revenue led to a defense of Chinese migrants’ presence but did not eliminate 
defenders’ racist beliefs.69 
Chinese migrants faced other special taxes, though the California Su-
preme Court would later strike them down on constitutional grounds.70 In Lin 
Sing v. Washburn, the California Supreme Court wrote that the Chinese cannot 
“be set apart as special subjects of taxation.”71 The Lin Sing court connected 
the taxation of Chinese migrants to banishment, as the act in question was “a 
measure of special and extreme hostility to the Chinese.”72 The California Su-
preme Court explicitly drew upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Passenger Cases, preventing states from taxing migrants ad infinitum.73 
                                                                                                                           
 66 For a scholarly argument as to why Chinese migration to California’s gold mines reflected 
“voluntary” labor as opposed to “coerced labor and debt peonage,” see Mae M. Ngai, Chinese Gold 
Miners and the “Chinese Question” in Nineteenth-Century California and Victoria, 101 J. AM. HIST. 
1082, 1083, 1097 n.30. (2015). (discussing the common trope of credit-financed migration and the 
specific huiguan system for Chinese migrants to America). 
 67 Kanazawa, supra note 58, at 788 (quoting Are the Chinese Injuring the State?, DAILY ALTA 
CAL., Nov. 5, 1855, at 2, CAL. DIGIT. NEWSPAPER COLLECTION, CTR. FOR BIBLIOGRAPHIC STUD. & 
RSCH., U.C. RIVERSIDE). 
 68 Id. at 788 (quoting an excerpt from an 1859 article appearing in the Auburn Herald) (citing 
DAILY ALTA CAL., Feb. 23, 1859, at 1, CAL. DIGIT. NEWSPAPER COLLECTION, CTR. FOR BIBLIO-
GRAPHIC STUD. & RSCH., U.C. RIVERSIDE). 
 69 Those who “declared that the Chinese were necessary for the advancement of the economy . . . 
even invented new arguments: the Chinese were more docile than the Hispanos . . . .” Pitt, supra note 
56, at 36. 
 70 Sarah H. Cleveland describes how even after the Supreme Court struck down head taxes in the 
Passenger Cases, states continued to try to create state-level immigration restrictions. 48 U.S. (7 
How.) 283 (1849); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, 
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 103–
07 (2002). In particular, California unsuccessfully tried to “satisfy the elusive constitutional strictures 
of” the Passenger Cases through failed attempts to tax Chinese migrants. Cleveland, supra, at 107 & 
n.728; see People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 171 (1857) (Murray, J., concurring) (“We, therefore, decide 
that the Act of this State, laying a tax of fifty dollars each on Chinese passengers, is invalid and 
void.”). 
 71 20 Cal. 534, 578 (1862). 
 72 Id. at 577. 
 73 Id. at 576. The early states were not unique in their desire to tax migrants ad infinitum. See, e.g., 
B Izzak, MP Urges Govt to Tax Expats for the ‘Air They Breathe,’ KUWAIT TIMES, Oct. 28, 2018, 
https://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/mp-urges-govt-to-tax-expats-for-the-air-they-breathe/ 
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Anti-Chinese discrimination also transcended tax law.74 The judicial void-
ing of California’s Chinese-targeted taxes did not deter Congress from eventu-
ally passing the Chinese Exclusion Act.75 It even took the Supreme Court to 
affirm that the guarantee of birthright citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment 
applied to Chinese-Americans.76 Labor unions protested the migration of Asian 
labor, and municipal ordinances even waged a war against Chinese restau-
rants.77 Amidst these various barriers, taxation of the Chinese reflected the fi-
nancial exercise of state power to disproportionately burden some foreign na-
tionals.78 
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/8EDZ-NWAB] (quoting the sole female member of Kuwait’s parliament, Safa Al-
Hashem, as desiring to tax migrants “for everything, . . . [including] the air they breathe here”). 
74 See D. Carolina Núñez, Dark Matter in the Law, 62 B.C. L. REV. 1555, 1559 (2021) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court’s unanimous upholding of the Chinese Exclusion Act “lives on . . . [and] is the 
existing foundation of over a century of immigration plenary power decisions and an institutional 
expression of xenophobia that seems inimical to basic constitutional ideals today”). 
 75 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Chinese Exclusion Repeal 
Act of 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600; IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION 
OF RACE 32 (rev. & updated 10th anniversary ed. 2006) (describing the Act as “the only U.S. law ever 
to exclude by name a particular nationality from citizenship”); Julian Lim, Immigration, Asylum, and 
Citizenship: A More Holistic Approach, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1013, 1028 (2013) (describing the late-
nineteenth century “[l]egislated exclusion” against the Chinese). For a discussion of the repeal of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act and the addition of the eligibility to naturalize in 1943, see Lucas Guttentag, The 
Forgotten Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 31 n.125 (2013). 
 76 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898). 
 77 By the beginning of the twentieth century, American unions also “opposed Asian immigration 
in general and Chinese restaurants in particular,” extending the legacy further. Gabriel J. Chin & John 
Ormonde, The War Against Chinese Restaurants, 67 DUKE L.J. 681, 689, 717–19 (2018) (describing 
municipal ordinances); cf. Krystyn R. Moon, On a Temporary Basis: Immigration, Labor Unions, and 
the American Entertainment Industry, 1880s–1930s, 99 J. AM. HIST. 771, 774–75 (2012) (“By the 
time of the Exclusion Act’s passage in 1882, opera and acrobatic troupes from China had been popu-
lar in the United States for thirty years . . . . [Nonetheless,] Chinese performers were denied admit-
tance for the first time under the 1888 amendment.”); id. at 783 (describing how many unions—the 
American Federation of Labor, the American Federation of Musicians, and Actors’ Equity Associa-
tion—supported these restrictions). 
 78 Globally, discriminatory taxation often advanced racial segregation, consolidating local Euro-
pean settler identity and power against Black and Brown natives. Settler-colonists challenged direct 
taxation by seeking exemptions for themselves and, as a counterbalance, amplifying taxation of native 
subjects. See generally PHILIP J. HAVIK, ALEXANDER KEESE & MACIEL SANTOS, ADMINISTRATION 
AND TAXATION IN FORMER PORTUGUESE AFRICA: 1900–1945, at 83–84 (2015) (analyzing twentieth-
century Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) Africa). Taxation of native subjects could compel finan-
cially stressed subjects to participate in the labor market and serve settler agriculture or mining. Id. 
When confronted with the taxation, the non-migrant African subjects “reacted and fled, they resisted 
or simply paid.” Id. at 82. Taxation thus served as an instrument to distill and privilege settler-colonial 
identity while foisting difficult choices upon long-standing African people. See Evelyn Nakano Glenn, 
Settler Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for Comparative Studies of U.S. Race and Gender 
Formation, 1 SOCIO. RACE & ETHNICITY 54, 57, 61 (2015) (noting historical instances of taxation as 
part of the settler-colonial structure). 
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The history and litigation of taxing migrants is thus contingent both on the 
nationality and ethnicity of those migrants as well as the identity of the “natives.” 
Taxation manifests hostility or welcome to individuals, in terms of both their 
money and their identities. When motivated by a desire for tax revenue, permit-
ting migrants to pay should not be confused with welcoming them. 
C. Modern Migration and the Public Fisc 
Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the current American tax and 
migration regimes began to take shape.79 In both state and federal tax codes, 
legislators balanced revenue-raising with migration concerns, echoing the de-
bates among Californians regarding the public-finance benefits of Chinese 
immigration.80 
One strain of these debates concerns who should “pay” for immigrants—
towns, states, the federal government, or the immigrants themselves.81 These 
longstanding debates preceded the migration cost-benefit discussion that arose 
in the Passenger Cases.82 In more modern times, these debates often presume 
                                                                                                                           
 79 The colonies became united “states” via constitutional ratification. Because ratification re-
quired nine “states,” New Hampshire’s ratification on June 21, 1788 arguably served “to bring the 
Constitution into effect” and transform the thirteen colonies into the United States. Gary Lawson & 
Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2001); see 
also U.S. CONST. art. VII.  
 80 State income taxation took hold in industrial New England largely in response to the fiscal 
exigencies of the Great Depression. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A 
HISTORY 86 (3d ed. 2016). Hawaii actually enacted the first “state tax” in 1901, prior to the federal 
Tax Revenue Act, but was not granted statehood until 1959. Scott Drenkard & Richard Borean, When 
Did Your State Adopt Its Income Tax?, TAX FOUND. (June 10, 2014), https://taxfoundation.org/when-
did-your-state-adopt-its-income-tax/ [https://perma.cc/4KPL-AK73]. Defenders of the wealthy initial-
ly tolerated a federal income tax as a way to “help take the wind out of the sails of more radical tax 
measures at the state and local levels.” BROWNLEE, supra, at 86. In modern day, state income and 
property tax rates vary considerably. See generally Tax Policies, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES https://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/tax-policy.aspx [https://perma.cc/7KP3-LGRN] 
(providing resources on both personal income taxes and property taxes). Despite subnational taxa-
tion’s percolation and the hopes of the wealthy, the Sixteenth Amendment ushered in the foundational 
federal income tax law in 1913 that funded immigration infrastructure, among other priorities. U.S. 
CONST. amend. XVI; Charles J. Cooper, Michael A. Carvin & Vincent J. Colatriano, The Legal Au-
thority of the Department of the Treasury to Promulgate a Regulation Providing for Indexation of 
Capital Gains, 12 VA. TAX REV. 631, 663–65 (1993) (discussing the Income Tax Law of 1913, Pub. 
L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114). 
 81 The unsuccessful plaintiffs in Padavan v. United States, for example, “claim[ed] that, in 1993, 
the cost to New York State and its subdivisions of providing services to legal and illegal immigrants 
amounted to $5.6 billion.” 82 F.3d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1996). See generally Shayak Sarkar, Financial 
Immigration Federalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1561 (2019) (analyzing the extent of permissible state activity 
in shaping immigrants’ access to various financial benefits and markets). 
 82 See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 385 (1849) (“If these two States have the burdens 
of foreign pauperism, so have they also the benefits of foreign commerce. The sails of their ships 
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that immigrants will impose a net tax burden despite empirical research to the 
contrary.83 Tax historians have noted how income tax revenue funded the ex-
pansion of the federal government in not only defense, education, and infra-
structure, but also in immigration regulation and enforcement.84 And yet at the 
end of the twentieth century, the State of New York sued, arguing that the fed-
eral power over immigration required it “to reimburse New York State for any 
costs . . . incurred as a consequence of the federal government’s immigration 
policy.”85 Although unsuccessful, the lawsuit nonetheless captured a persistent 
state sentiment: that the federal government needed to pay the states for their 
acceptance of immigrants.86 
These debates also addressed the tax treatment, and potential fiscal impact, 
of third parties in the migration process. For example, the federal tax code privi-
leges immigrant-aid organizations, yet localities desire the jobs and tax reve-
nue raised from immigrant detention centers.87 In nineteenth-century America, 
voluntary associations helped immigrants acclimate to a new country, rejecting 
more formal assistance and evoking colonial “hostility to centralized authority 
and to a spirit of individualism.”88 Under the federal tax code, these organiza-
                                                                                                                           
whiten every sea, while the internal States, shut out from the ocean, have no such benefits in the same 
degree.”); supra Sections I.A–B (describing earlier debates around migrant costs and benefits). 
 83 See, e.g., Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, Giovanni Peri & Greg C. Wright, Immigration, Trade and 
Productivity in Services: Evidence from U.K. Firms, 112 J. INT. ECON. 88 (2018) (finding that migrant 
flows in the United Kingdom led to firms increasing productivity and reducing offshoring, due to a 
reallocation of tasks to immigrants); Giovanni Peri & Vasil Yasenov, The Labor Market Effects of a 
Refugee Wave: Synthetic Control Method Meets the Mariel Boatlift, 54 J. HUM. RES. 267 (2019) (find-
ing no significant changes to the wages of non-Cuban high school dropouts in Miami, based on con-
trol groups in cities with similar labor market conditions). 
 84 See, e.g., BROWNLEE, supra note 80, at 115. 
 85 Padavan, 82 F.3d at 26. The Second Circuit’s decision affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
the complaint for failure to state a claim. Id. at 30. 
 86 A similar sentiment is now rearing its head, twenty-five years later, as border states pursue 
litigation against lax federal enforcement and try to establish their legal standing to do so. Complaint 
at 3, Texas v. United States, Case 21-cv-00003 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2021) (“When DHS fails to remove 
illegal aliens in compliance with federal law, Texas faces significant costs. A higher number of illegal 
aliens in Texas leads to budgetary harms, including higher education and healthcare costs.”); see also 
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (affirming, by an equally divided court, Texas’s cost-
based standing to challenge the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program). 
 87 These are specific examples of federal tax treatment shaping and attracting migrants. For a 
comprehensive discussion of how localities and states are fashioning non-tax policies to attract mi-
grants, often against federal priorities, see generally Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, 
Sanctuary Networks, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1209 (2019). 
 88 Anthony C. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On Adopting a Comparative Approach to 
Reforming the U.S. International Tax Regime, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1105, 1160 (2002) (noting 
how “[v]oluntary associations met the colonists’ needs by providing them ‘a way to confront common 
problems while still retaining a significant measure of individual initiative’” (quoting Lester M. Sala-
mon, The United States, in DEFINING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 280, 
282 (1997)). See generally Shayak Sarkar, Crediting Migrants, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 281 (2019), 
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tions evolved into the U.S. nonprofit sector thanks to statutory tax exemp-
tions.89 The modern-day immigrants rights’ movement includes robust non-
profits, whose federal tax status may also exempt them from state and local 
property and income taxes.90 At the same time, California municipalities have 
openly acknowledged that immigration detention facilities produce tax revenue 
and jobs for local denizens.91 Tax law reflects costs and benefits not only to the 
migrants, but also to third parties, whether benevolent organizations or the “im-
migration-industrial complex.”92 
Finally, as in the colonial and early American context, modern emigration 
raises concerns of a shrinking tax base.93 State and local tax policies are not 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/crediting-migrants/ [https://perma.cc/6FHN-QDCP] (dis-
cussing the history and contemporary debates surrounding the public charge rule in immigration). 
 89 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRE-
SENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS 46–47 (Comm. Print 2005) (tracing the evolution of tax exemption of charitable organizations 
from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century, finishing with the 1996 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights’ “imposed excise taxes on ‘excess benefit transactions’ between a charitable 
organization and an insider of the organization”). For a modern take on the charitable exemption, see 
David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 
S-451, S-451 (2014) (noting how the federal income tax exemption has grown from charities and 
fraternal benefit societies to dozens of “different types of tax-exempt entities in section 501(c) alone 
and by some counts more than 70 in all[,]” begging re-examination of the exemptions’ policy bases). 
 90 ELS DE GRAAUW, MAKING IMMIGRANT RIGHTS REAL: NONPROFITS AND THE POLITICS OF 
INTEGRATION IN SAN FRANCISCO 47 (2016). 
 91 See, e.g., Farida Jhabvala Romero, ICE Signs New For-Profit Detention Contracts Days Before 
California’s Ban Begins, KQED (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/11792302/ice-poised-
to-sign-new-for-profit-detention-contracts-before-californias-ban-begins [https://perma.cc/7FRR-
V7VJ]. Nonetheless, the California state legislature passed a law banning for-profit prisons and deten-
tion centers. Assemb. B. 32, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 92 Karen Manges Douglas & Rogelio Sáenz, The Criminalization of Immigrants & the Immigra-
tion-Industrial Complex, 142 DAEDALUS 199, 210, 212 (2013) (discussing the complex’s major fea-
tures as including “powerful interests,” such as the “variety of corporations [that] have contracts with 
ICE to house immigrant detainees”). See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Criminaliz-
ing Migration, 150 DAEDALUS 106, 108–09 (2021) (describing the escalation of criminal law’s con-
nection to American immigration law in the late-twentieth century); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration 
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 382–86 (2006) (same). 
 93 See, e.g., David R. Agrawal & Dirk Foremny, Relocation of the Rich: Migration in Response to 
Top Tax Rate Changes from Spanish Reforms, 101 REV. ECON. & STAT. 214, 231–32 (2019) (empiri-
cally finding increased mobility in response to tax rate differentials across regions, though the higher 
tax rates appear to offset outflows). Income tax rates are only one factor in emigration from particular 
areas. For a rich discussion of how economists theorize interstate migration and the usefulness of 
place-based tax policies to revive struggling regions, see generally Benjamin Austin, Edward Glaeser 
& Lawrence Summers, Jobs for the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st-Century America, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2018, at 151, 156–69, 215–17; Gilles Duranton & 
Robert E. Hall, Comments and Discussion, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2018, at 
233, 245. 
2226 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2209 
immune to interstate migration by high-earners.94 After the Great Recession, 
states, including California, raised both sales tax rates and the income tax rates 
of the highest income earners to fund education.95 The tax increases reaped 
smaller financial gains than hoped, due partly to top-earner outmigration to 
low-tax states.96 High-tax states go to great lengths to monitor outmigration 
through residency audits and investigations.97 The crossing of even local and 
state borders can catalyze tax revenue concerns. 
This outmigration phenomenon also consumes the national stage. Previ-
ous presidential candidates’ wealth tax proposals, for example, have addressed 
the possibility of outmigration to other countries by imposing more significant 
“exit taxes”98 than in existing tax law.99 Scholars view the exit tax as permit-
                                                                                                                           
 94 David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 
87 & n.24 (2017) (discussing the “sparse” legal literature on interstate migration while pushing the 
issue of “interstate mobility to the forefront”). Schleicher also makes a connection between interna-
tional and interstate migrants by arguing that “international migra[tion] may help reduce some of the 
costs imposed by limits on interstate migration . . . .” Id. at 86 n.22. See generally Tiebout, supra note 
32. 
 95 California’s changes were passed by voters in a 2012 ballot initiative, Proposition 30, and then 
again four years later in another ballot initiative, extending the increase into the next decade. See, e.g., 
Proposition 30: Temporary Taxes to Fund Education. Guaranteed Local Public Safety Funding. Initi-
ative Constitutional Amendment, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (July 18, 2012), https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/
2012/30_11_2012.aspx [https://perma.cc/L28F-B6AK] (raising top-income bracket tax rates by one to 
three percentage points); Track Prop 30/Prop 55, CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFF., https://track
prop55.sco.ca.gov/ [https://perma.cc/B7Y8-GRLS]; see also Assemb. B. 1253, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2020) (proposing, in anticipation of pandemic-related revenue losses, further increases to 
the personal income tax rates for the highest earners). 
 96 Empirical evidence now suggests that California tax increases fell short of revenue projections 
because of outmigration, a term I use to connote movement from one state to another. Joshua Rauh & 
Ryan J. Shyu, Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from Cali-
fornia 31–32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26349, 2019) (using administrative 
data to show concentrated top-income bracket outmigration in response to the 2012 passage of Propo-
sition 30). 
 97 See Scott R. Thomas, Domicile in Multistate Personal Income Tax Residency Matters: Enter 
the Swamp at Your Own Peril, 39 PACE L. REV. 875, 882–83 (2019) (describing residency audits of 
Florida retirees among others). In fact, one such residency investigation was so intrusive that it gener-
ated litigation that reached the Supreme Court three times. See generally Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 
139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016); Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003). 
 98 Issues: Tax on Extreme Wealth, BERNIE, https://berniesanders.com/issues/tax-extreme-wealth/ 
[https://perma.cc/K4T4-DXNT] (noting that Bernie Sanders’ proposed “wealth tax includes a 40 per-
cent exit tax on the net value of all assets under $1 billion and 60 percent over $1 billion for all 
wealthy individuals seeking to expatriate to avoid the tax”); Ultra-Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMO-
CRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-tax [https://perma.cc/G54G-SETF] (noting 
that Elizabeth Warren’s proposed wealth tax imposes “a 40% ‘exit tax’ on the net worth above $50 
million of any U.S. citizen who renounces their citizenship”). 
 99 See 26 U.S.C §§  877,  877(a)(1)–(3) (noting relevant individuals to whom the exit tax applies); 
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, How Would a Progressive Wealth Tax Work? Evidence from the 
Economics Literature, GABRIEL ZUCMAN 7 (Feb. 5, 2019), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/saez-
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ting source countries to benefit from migrants’ post-departure income.100 In 
this way, tax law grapples with human mobility, focusing on people for the 
money they bring or take away. 
II. CONTEMPORARY INSTANCES OF TAX LAW’S MIGRATION 
Beyond generalized intersections, tax law explicitly polices migration. 
This Part analyzes examples of how tax law does so, as exemplified by two 
contemporary case studies. Section A discusses pandemic relief. Although it is 
an almost universal congressional scheme that distributes extraordinary 
amounts of money to people in dire circumstances, it may leave millions of 
taxpaying migrants behind.101 Section B then details the joint-enforcement ac-
tions of the IRS and Department of Homeland Security that target particular 
places and taxpayers.102 In the process, the federal government may sharpen its 
enforcement teeth on the backs of vulnerable migrants, including lawful resi-
dents. Courts possess limited ability to constrain the migrant-policing aspect of 
tax law’s migration. 
A. Pandemic Relief 
Consider the newest site of tax law’s policing of migrants—emergency 
economic relief amidst what the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General called 
“the greatest test that we have faced” since the UN’s formation: the COVID-19 
pandemic.103 The American tax system has long confronted acute emergencies, 
with wildfire victims exempted from ordinary filing deadlines and personal 
casualty loss limits in 2020.104 Earthquake victims have received similar dis-
                                                                                                                           
zucman-wealthtaxobjections.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4U7-P9YT] (noting how the proposals “build[] 
on the existing exit tax”); see also Mason, supra note 7, at 172 n.12 (distinguishing the unique Ameri-
can citizenship tax from the oft-cited Eritrean citizenship tax). 
 100 See, e.g., Anu Bradford, Sharing the Risks and Rewards of Economic Migration, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 29, 39 (2013); see also Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Taxing the Brain Drain, 19 CHALLENGE 34, 35 
(1976) (proposing a “brain drain tax” (i) “to be paid by the migrant as a supplement to his normal 
income tax in the country of immigration,” (ii) “to be levied on his income after emigration,” and (iii) 
to be allocated “for developmental spending in the L[ess] D[eveloped] C[ountries]”). 
 101 See infra notes 103–159, and accompanying text. 
 102 See infra notes 160–214, and accompanying text. 
 103 Coronavirus: Greatest Test Since World War Two, Says UN Chief, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52114829 [https://perma.cc/3FUV-DF9P]. 
 104 MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS 
OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 17–18 (2013) (describing how “early tax remissions quickly 
gave way to direct federal relief”); Tax Help for California Wildfire Victims, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/tax-help-for-california-wildfire-victims (Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.
cc/YE8R-TKXR]. 
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pensations.105 Beyond extensions and expanded deductions, Congress em-
ployed the tax system to distribute emergency relief for the COVID-19 pan-
demic, starting with the CARES Act.106 
One of the CARES Act’s most notable provisions is its stimulus pay-
ments, structured as refundable “credit against the tax imposed.”107 The relief 
leveraged the tax system to make cash payments totaling hundreds of billions 
of dollars to American families in distinct rounds.108 Yet the relief initially ex-
cluded many immigrants, from citizen children to undocumented adults.109 
1. Round One of Pandemic Relief and Constitutional Challenges to 
Immigrant Restrictions 
In the first round of relief, Congress excluded many immigrant adults and 
children through two tax identification number requirements.110 Although feder-
al tax law requires people without Social Security Numbers to file taxes using an 
ITIN,111 the CARES Act prioritized Social Security Numbers.112 First, because 
of Social Security Number requirements for filing adults, undocumented adults 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See, e.g., IRS Announces Tax Relief for Utah Earthquake Victims, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
(July 24, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-announces-tax-relief-for-utah-earthquake-victims 
[https://perma.cc/37XC-B6LQ]. See generally Treas. Reg. § 301.7508A-1 (as amended in 2021) 
(providing rules for “[p]ostponement of certain tax-related deadlines by reasons of a federally de-
clared disaster”). 
 106 CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). Section 1102 of the Act, for example, 
establishes the Paycheck Protection Program through the Small Business Administration. 
 107 Id. § 2201(a) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6428(a)). 
 108 Letter from Congr. Budget Off. to Hon. Mike Enzi, Chairman, Comm. on the Budget, U.S. 
Senate 12–13 (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-04/hr748.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8LH3-VU4E]; Chuck Marr, Kris Cox, Kathleen Bryant, Stacy Dean, Roxy Caines & Arloc Sherman, 
Aggressive State Outreach Can Help Reach the 12 Million Non-Filers Eligible for Stimulus Payments, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/aggressive-state-
outreach-can-help-reach-the-12-million-non-filers-eligible-for (Oct. 14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
RME9-E734] (“To deliver these payments to the nation’s roughly 300 million eligible people, poli-
cymakers chose the IRS, which has contact with a large share of the population.”). 
 109 See infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text. Although the definition of “undocumented” 
varies in relation to statutes and government programs, I use the term here to indicate a lack of a So-
cial Security Number that some noncitizens possess. See generally Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of 
Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1126–46 (2015) (discussing the types of, and synonyms for, 
“nonstatus” and “no status” in American immigration law). 
 110 Julia Gelatt, Randy Capps & Michael Fix, Nearly 3 Million U.S. Citizens and Legal Immi-
grants Initially Excluded Under the CARES Act Are Covered Under the December 2020 COVID-19 
Stimulus, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., (Jan. 2021), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/cares-act-
excluded-citizens-immigrants-now-covered [https://perma.cc/SJ2P-M6CL]. 
 111 Individual Taxpayer Identification Number, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
individuals/individual-taxpayer-identification-number (Aug. 6, 2021) [https://perma.cc/3RWC-MJNY]. 
 112 See generally Lipman, supra note 9 at 20–26 (discussing the taxation of undocumented immi-
grants); Gelatt et al., supra note 110. 
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were ineligible for the $1,200 payments ($2,400 for couples).113 Military service 
was the rare credential rescuing a couple’s eligibility from immigration re-
strictions.114 Second, undocumented children were ineligible for the $500 pay-
ments otherwise intended for minors.115 
The first adult-focused restriction collaterally excluded even documented 
children. For families, the bill’s narrow definition of “valid identification num-
ber” meant that citizen children faced exclusion based on undocumented par-
ents, even if those parents were tax-compliant.116 In one Congressman’s words, 
this denial of relief to citizens based on their household members “punishe[d] 
mixed-status households and denie[d] some American citizens benefits they 
deserve[d].”117 As millions of Americans without Social Security Numbers live 
in these mixed-status families, the initial exclusion had a broad impact.118 
Constitutional challenges arose against the migrant-exclusionary pay-
ments. In R.V. v. Mnuchin, citizen plaintiffs119 alleged that the CARES Act tax 
benefits violated equal protection, arguing that by treating those with undocu-
mented parents worse than similarly-situated citizen children whose parents 
possess Social Security Numbers, it penalized children for their parents’ immi-
gration status.120 The plaintiffs asserted that rendering such children “second-
class” through the denial of payments serves no important government interest, 
undermines the goal of providing immediate cash assistance to Americans and 
the economy, and is not substantially related to any potential government inter-
                                                                                                                           
 113 CARES Act § 2201(a), 26 U.S.C. § 6428(a)(1). 
 114 Id. § 6428(g)(3). An early version of the Senate bill actually excluded all joint-filers where a 
single spouse lacked a Social Security Number, though the final legislation made an exception for 
couples where a spouse was a member of the Armed Forces. 
 115 Id. § 6428(a)(2). 
 116 Id. § 6428(a), (g)(1). 
 117 166 CONG. REC. H1841 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2020) (statement of Rep. Cox); see also Ariel 
Jurow Kleiman, Impoverishment by Taxation, 170 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript 
at 41) (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 20-480), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3775246 [https://perma.
cc/FE7N-E8PP] (arguing that the group most vulnerable to impoverishment by taxation “is working 
families with children who cannot claim refundable tax credits,” namely “[f]amilies in which one 
parent lacks a work-eligible social security number,” as “[t]hese families will almost surely face posi-
tive federal income taxes in addition to regressive state and local taxes”). 
 118 Paul Taylor, Mark Hugo Lopez, Jeffrey S. Passel & Seth Motel, Unauthorized Immigrants: 
Length of Residency, Patterns of Parenthood, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.pewresearch.
org/hispanic/2011/12/01/unauthorized-immigrants-length-of-residency-patterns-of-parenthood/ [https://
perma.cc/UY6E-NRX4]. 
 119 Although the plaintiffs were in fact all citizens, and sought to certify a class of citizen chil-
dren, noncitizen children with Social Security Numbers were still eligible for the payments, though 
they would be relatively few in number. R.V. v. Mnuchin, No. 20-cv-1148, 2020 WL 3402300, at *1 
(D. Md. June 19, 2020). 
 120 Class Action Complaint ¶ 72, R.V. ex rel. N.R. v. Mnuchin, No. 20-cv-1148, 2020 WL 
2126964 (D. Md. May 5, 2020). 
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est in denying assistance to their relatives.121 The court’s ruling on the motion to 
dismiss was perfunctory. It established that the plaintiffs adequately pled the 
possibility that the CARES Act discriminates against the citizen children plain-
tiffs, but reserved the substantive analysis, including whether heightened scruti-
ny or rational basis applied.122 
Spouses of excluded adults also sued, with technical tax statuses underly-
ing the constitutional claims. In Amador v. Mnuchin, adult plaintiffs argued 
that the denial of payments based on their spouses’ undocumented status vio-
lated their marriage-based due process and equal protection rights, as well as 
their First Amendment speech and associational rights.123 In adjudicating the 
government’s motion to dismiss, the court explained that although it was true 
that the jointly-filing spouses may file separately to obtain at least the $1,200 
payment (one half of the $2,400 payment to couples), “a federal joint tax re-
turn is a fixture in the ‘constellation of benefits’ . . . ‘linked to marriage.’”124 In 
other words, the ability for married couples to file separately does not elimi-
nate the key constitutional concern about the rights to marriage, and the strict 
scrutiny that attaches. Financially penalizing spouses who choose to marry the 
undocumented “demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Con-
stitution protects . . . .”125 
Amador directly connects the denial of the married person’s right to file 
jointly with the IRS to the married person’s right to the IRS’s payment. The 
denial of the payment diminishes more than the joint-filer’s bank account. 
Echoing constitutional litigation around same-sex marriage that similarly fo-
cused on the tax code, the Amador court found support for the plaintiffs’ inti-
mate association claims.126 The inability to file jointly diminishes the marital 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Id. ¶¶ 72–74. 
 122 R.V., 2020 WL 3402300, at *8. 
 123 Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 62–75, Amador v. Mnuchin, 
No. 20-cv-01102, 2020 WL 2063750 (D. Md. Apr. 28, 2020). 
 124 Amador v. Mnuchin, 476 F. Supp. 3d 125, 152 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 
576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015)). 
 125 Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)). 
 126 Id. at 157 (“[F]or the same reasons that plaintiffs have stated a Fifth Amendment claim, they 
have also alleged a viable violation of their First Amendment right to intimate association.”). See 
generally Shayak Sarkar, Intimate Employment, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 429, 444–51 (2016) (trac-
ing the origins and evolution of “intimate association”). Notably, the court expressed skepticism of, 
but avoided ruling on, the First Amendment freedom of speech claim, stating that it “need not decide 
whether a truthful tax return falls within the First Amendment’s ambit” in light of the other claims. 
Amador, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 157. The court was more sanguine, however, about the plaintiffs’ pro-
spects on rational-basis review, characterizing the joint-filing limitation as an “unnecessary prophylac-
tic” in Congress’s prioritization of the work-authorized. Id. at 153. “Unnecessary” is reconcilable with 
surviving rational basis review. Maria Ponomarenko, Administrative Rationality Review, 104 VA. L. 
REV. 1399, 1423 (2018) (arguing that “the constitutional rationality of legislative choices often boil[s] 
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relationship that the Constitution and the State have long “sought to digni-
fy.”127 Amador’s linkage of tax-filing status to intimate association lies in ten-
sion with scholarly concerns about promoting such familial values through the 
joint return.128 Nonetheless, by implicating the fundamental right to marry in 
joint-filing, plaintiffs challenged a form of tax-based immigration enforcement. 
Although these challenges to migrant restrictions initially prevailed, they 
face substantial doctrinal headwinds. Constitutional theories of association and 
family integrity, often raised in immigration challenges, face a mixed recep-
tion.129 In Kerry v. Din, the Supreme Court pithily responded to a plaintiff su-
ing for the denial of her Afghan husband’s immigrant visa as infringing on her 
right to live stateside with her spouse.130 The Court retorted that “[t]here is no 
such constitutional right.”131 Even for the Trump administration’s family sepa-
rations at the border, an infamous affront to familial integrity, one scholar drew 
on Din, explaining that “longstanding doctrines of deference continue to per-
mit family separation even for the most favored status of migrant, namely the 
spouses of U.S. citizens.”132 Others studying family separation look beyond the 
American Constitution to highlight international law’s protections, which 
nonetheless present hurdles to securing a remedy.133 
As such, these constitutional challenges’ ongoing viability should not be 
mistaken for ultimate success. The power of litigation’s early-stage survival 
can also be measured by subsequent legislative responses.134 That response 
                                                                                                                           
down to claims that the measures are unnecessary” and that “[f]or the most part, these choices are for 
legislatures, not courts, to make”). 
 127 Amador, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (quoting Windsor, 570 U.S. at 772). 
 128 See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and 
the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 64 (1993) (“Many people believe that the joint 
return is necessary because it promotes family values. To the extent that the return does so, it does so 
poorly.”). 
 129 Compare Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 510 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2007) (“So long 
as the detention is lawful, that so-called deprivation of the right to family integrity does not violate the 
Constitution.”), with Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1162, 1168 
(S.D. Cal. 2018) (recognizing substantive due process to familial integrity against “the Government’s 
separation of migrant parents and their minor children when both are held in immigration detention 
and when there has been no showing the parent is unfit or poses a danger to the child”). 
 130 576 U.S. 86, 88 (2015). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Stephen Lee, Family Separation as Slow Death, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2319, 2340 (2019). 
 133 Carrie F. Cordero, Heidi Li Feldman, & Chimène I. Keitner, The Law Against Family Separa-
tion, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 430, 476–77, 502–03 (2020). 
 134 See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, Law and Social Movements: Reimagining the Progressive Can-
on, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 441, 450 (describing “progressive legal campaigns a[s] backward-looking” and 
noting “the limits of litigation and courts in producing sustained change over time”). 
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marginally expanded eligibility but still left immigrant rights advocates dissat-
isfied.135 
2. Subsequent Rounds of Pandemic Relief and the Future 
Neither Amador nor R.V. reached a final resolution before Congress ap-
proved subsequent rounds of pandemic relief that only slightly narrowed the 
immigrant exclusion.136 Advocacy groups’ non-litigation efforts may have 
helped broaden relief.137 The second-round payments included $600 for eligi-
ble individuals ($1,200 for couples) and for each eligible dependent.138 For 
joint-filers where one spouse possessed a Social Security Number but the other 
did not, the eligible spouse would still receive $600, ending the financial pun-
ishment to the eligible spouse while continuing to differentiate mixed-status 
couples.139 Additionally, the second round maintained the requirement for a 
qualifying child’s parent to have a Social Security Number to be eligible for 
the $600 dependent payment.140 
The American Rescue Plan’s third round of payments was the most inclu-
sive, allowing dependent credits for documented children even where no filing 
parent had a valid Social Security Number.141 The third round was also the 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., National Immigration. Law Center. (NILC) 
Statement Regarding $900 Billion COVID Relief Package (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.nilc.org/
2020/12/21/nilc-statement-regarding-900-billion-covid-relief-package/ [https://perma.cc/6XWM-
MNWJ] (bemoaning how “Congress unconscionably continues to exclude” undocumented immigrants 
from relief) (quoting Marielena Hincapié, Executive Director of the National Immigration Law Cen-
ter). 
 136 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182 (2020). 
 137 See, e.g., Letter from Hum. Rts. Watch to Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Reps, 
and Hon. Charles Schumer, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2020/03/20/rights-groups-urge-inclusion-immigrant-families-coronavirus-relief-bill [https://
perma.cc/UZ5X-83DR] (addressing the tax rebate proposal as well as healthcare access for undocu-
mented immigrants, particularly free COVID-19 testing); Rafael Bernal, Hispanic Advocacy Organi-
zation Launches Campaign to Include Immigrants in Pandemic Relief, THE HILL (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://thehill.com/latino/492709-hispanic-advocacy-organization-launches-campaign-to-include-
immigrants-in-pandemic?rl=1 [https://perma.cc/9M6T-XJK8] (describing the UnidosUS Action 
Fund’s campaign as specifically targeting congressional leaders); #ImmigrantsAreEssential, UNIDOS
US ACTION FUND, https://www.unidosusaf.org/immigrantsareessential [https://perma.cc/5GSQ-U7FM] 
(capturing a multimedia strategy to combat Congress’s CARES Act exclusions); see also Press Re-
lease, Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., supra note 135 (praising “the inclusion of 3.5 million people in mixed-
status families in the new payments”) (quoting Marielena Hincapié, Executive Director of the Nation-
al Immigration Law Center). 
 138 26 U.S.C. § 6428A(a). The new law also allows for retroactive payments for those originally 
excluded but newly included. Id. 
 139 Id. § 6428A(g)(2)(A). 
 140 Id. § 6428A(g)(3)–(4). 
 141 Id. § 6428B. 
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most generous, providing $1,400 for each eligible individual and dependent.142 
Yet, many undocumented immigrants, including those without eligible docu-
mented children, remained without relief.143 The constitutional litigation and 
advocacy groups may have nudged Congress towards inclusion, but the subse-
quent rounds of relief still embrace tax law’s migration, specifically using tax 
law to distinguish and disadvantage migrants in emergency circumstances. 
This persistent exclusion does not necessarily comport with the public’s 
targeted economic sympathy. Even as some Americans approve of severe bor-
der restrictions, they also favor immigrant-inclusive economic relief.144 In a 
poll conducted by National Public Radio, more of those polled supported ex-
tending pandemic payments to “immigrants who pay U.S. taxes” than op-
posed.145 The question did not define “U.S. taxes” but presumably included 
personal income tax, as the Amador plaintiffs emphasized, not merely sales 
taxes.146 At the same time, the vast majority of those polled supported not only 
temporarily closing the U.S. border but also banning the entry of asylum seekers, 
foreign workers, and relatives of legal immigrants.147 This support for targeted 
emergency relief comports with a preference for at least minimum economic and 
social support for migrants, whether “providing safe and sanitary conditions for 
asylum seekers”148 or “medical care to undocumented immigrants who are ill 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Id. § 6428B(b). 
 143 See generally MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, JANE G. GRAVELLE & MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46680, THE AMERICAN RESCUE PLAN ACT OF 2021 (ARPA; H.R. 1319): TITLE 
IX, SUBTITLE G—TAX PROVISIONS RELATED TO PROMOTING ECONOMIC SECURITY 4–6 (2021) 
(summarizing how “[e]ligible individuals and dependents generally need to have a Social Security 
Number (SSN) to receive the payment”). 
 144 Public Poll Findings and Methodology: Most Americans Support Single, National Strategy to 
Combat COVID-19, IPSOS 1, 11–12 (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/
documents/2020-08/topline_npr_covid_and_immigration_080420.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ3U-MRMJ] 
(finding 49% in support vs. 43% opposed). 
 145 Id. at 12. The NPR Poll is somewhat unique insofar as it (i) specifies undocumented taxpayers 
and (ii) compares various immigration-related and other strategies to address COVID-19. Id. at 11–12. 
In contrast, the similarly timed results from a Pew Research Center poll found more limited support 
for “economic help to undocumented immigrants who have lost their job due to the outbreak” (regard-
less of taxpaying status), but significantly more support for “medical care to undocumented immi-
grants who are ill with the coronavirus.” Jens Manuel Krogstad & Mark Hugo Lopez, Americans 
Favor Medical Care but Not Economic Aid for Undocumented Immigrants Affected by COVID-19, 
PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/20/americans-
favor-medical-care-but-not-economic-aid-for-undocumented-immigrants-affected-by-covid-19/ 
[https://perma.cc/QP73-AK9U]. 
 146 IPSOS, supra note 144, at 11–12. 
 147 Id. at 10. 
 148 Most Americans Are Critical of Government’s Handling of Situation at U.S.-Mexico Border, 
PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 3, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/05/03/most-americans-
are-critical-of-governments-handling-of-situation-at-u-s-mexico-border/ [https://perma.cc/J6TC-TWQF]. 
Nonetheless, support for such conditions coincides with broad support for reducing the number of 
 
2234 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2209 
with the coronavirus.”149 Despite Congress’s stinginess, Americans’ attitudes 
toward the undocumented appears financially solicitous when dire circum-
stances arise, even while towing a stricter line on border controls. Tax law re-
flects an unpopular way to exclude poor and vulnerable immigrants.150 
Not all localities and states have followed the federal model of tying fi-
nancial relief to immigration status. Seeking to cover workers excluded from 
federal aid, New York allocated billions of dollars to workers for COVID-19-
related income losses without concern for immigration status.151 California 
also announced an effort to provide cash relief to undocumented immigrants 
ineligible for federal relief, utilizing a mix of taxpayer funds and private phi-
lanthropy.152 Counties and municipalities followed with their own gap-filling 
programs, building upon responses to past natural disasters.153 Unlike the fed-
eral relief, however, some of these programs did not create an entitlement, be-
                                                                                                                           
people seeking asylum and for “mak[ing] it harder for asylum seekers to be granted legal status in the 
U.S.” Id. 
 149 Krogstad & Lopez, supra note 145. 
 150 See id.; Immigration, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx [https://
perma.cc/A756-VBE5] (documenting how, since 2006, a majority of survey respondents have said 
that it is either “extremely important” or “very important” that “the government takes steps this year to 
. . . [c]ontrol[] U.S. borders to halt the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S.”). Other countries’ tax 
systems and emergency relief also distinguish migrants. In one Korean province, economic relief 
initially only extended to citizens, but within a month, the province extended payments to permanent 
residents. Kim Bo-gyung, Marriage Immigrants, Permanent Residents in Gyeonggi to Receive Disas-
ter Relief Aid, KOREA HERALD (Apr. 20, 2020), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=2020
0420000604 [https://perma.cc/KT97-HGJU]. The province’s governor approved this shift towards an 
“inclusive approach” while nonetheless remarking that “disbursing aid to . . . illegal immigrants . . . 
would be going too far.” Id.; see also Update: COVID-19 Pandemic Unemployment Payment for 
Undocumented People, MIGRANT RTS. CTR. IR., (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.mrci.ie/2020/11/04/
update-covid-19-pandemic-unemployment-payment-for-undocumented-people/ [https://perma.cc/
4Q4N-3HF7] (discussing taxpaying requirements for Ireland’s Pandemic Unemployment Payment 
and undocumented eligibility for Exceptional Needs and Urgent Needs Payment). 
 151 Excluded Workers Fund, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF LAB., https://dol.ny.gov/excluded-workers-
fund [https://perma.cc/2SSJ-4DSZ]. 
 152 Coronavirus (COVID-19) Disaster Relief Assistance for Immigrants, CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. 
SERVS., https://www.cdss.ca.gov/inforesources/immigration/covid-19-drai [https://perma.cc/4PGD-
LG5Z] [hereinafter California COVID-19 Relief]; see also Roberto Suro & Hannah Findling, State 
and Local Aid for Immigrants During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Innovating Inclusion, CTR. FOR MI-
GRATION STUD. (July 8, 2020), https://cmsny.org/publications/state-local-aid-immigrants-covid-19-
pandemic-innovating-inclusion/ [https://perma.cc/6XSG-MZ6V] (cataloguing “[s]tate and local juris-
dictions extending Coronavirus economic relief measures to unauthorized migrants”). 
 153 See, e.g., Susan Augusty, COVID-19: Emergency Assistance Relief Payment (EARP), INFO 
MONTGOMERY (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.infomontgomery.org/covid-19-emergency-assistance-
relief-payment-earp/ [https://perma.cc/83XV-WDB4] (not listing a Social Security Number as a requi-
site for eligibility); About, UNDOCUFUNDSF, https://www.undocufund-sf.org/en/about-us/ [https://
perma.cc/4VCS-RPTP]. 
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cause funds were limited and could only reach a fraction of otherwise eligible 
immigrants.154 
Despite their limited scope, the more inclusive subnational programs also 
spurred legal challenges, distinct from the lawsuits against the federal re-
strictions.155 Litigation against allegedly overly-inclusive local and state pro-
grams implicates “financial immigration federalism.”156 The boundary between 
local authority over economic aid to migrants and federal enforcement priori-
ties remains contested.157 States are nonetheless forging ahead, including by 
expanding certain tax credits to undocumented immigrants, which the federal 
government has denied for decades.158 
In sum, relief restrictions reflect the tax system’s policing of our borders, 
one facet of tax law’s migration. The initial round of federal relief punished not 
only ineligible, undocumented individuals but also otherwise eligible members 
of mixed-status households. The subsequent rounds expanded relief, including 
for citizen children with no documented guardians. Yet, the broader exclusion of 
undocumented adults and children remains. In a once-in-a-century pandemic,159 
tax law remains a tool to exclude migrants, which constitutional litigation alone 
has not been able to override. 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Compare California COVID-19 Relief, supra note 152 (noting how “state funding is expected 
to reach about 150,000 undocumented adults”), with Joseph Hayes & Laura Hill, Undocumented Im-
migrants in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (Mar. 2017), https://www.ppic.org/publication/
undocumented-immigrants-in-california/ [https://perma.cc/PCX5-VXLX] (estimating millions of 
undocumented adults in California). 
 155 See, e.g., Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandate or Other Extraordinary or Immediate Re-
lief, Benitez v. Newsom, 2020 Cal. LEXIS 3141 (Cal. May 6, 2020) (No. S261804), 2020 WL 
2094222. The petition argued that the Governor’s program violated federal law in providing a public 
benefit to those lacking lawful status without the state enactment of an affirmative law as required by 
8 U.S.C. § 1621. Id. at 1. The petition also argued that the governor’s program violated state law by 
making a “gift to a nonprofit” that “cannot be deemed for a valid public purpose . . . .” Id. at 2. The 
petition was denied. Benitez, 2020 Cal. LEXIS 3141, at *1. 
 156 See generally Sarkar, supra note 81, at 1569 (describing “financial arenas in which . . . state 
[and local] immigration-status restrictions are either less or more restrictive than parallel federal re-
strictions”). 
 157 Id. at 1598–1602 (acknowledging federal tax credits’ immigration-based restrictions and dis-
cussing how they may preempt state tax credits, an analysis straddling doctrines of tax preemption and 
immigration preemption). 
 158 See infra notes 265–266 and accompanying text. 
 159 Donald G. McNeil Jr., Fauci on What Working for Trump Was Really Like, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/24/health/fauci-trump-covid.html [https://perma.cc/
7RXY-TRUN] (statement of Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases) (“We are living through a historic pandemic, the likes of which we haven’t seen 
in 102 years.”). 
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B. Joint Immigration-Tax Enforcement 
Beyond tax laws policing poor migrants through financial deprivation, tax 
and immigration enforcement officers may literally collaborate. Although 
guardrails on information sharing and constitutional constraints impede joint 
immigration-tax enforcement, joint enforcement’s viability looks troublingly 
bright.160 Such joint enforcement continues a bipartisan tradition of workplace 
enforcement.161 New examples of joint enforcement decentralize ICE’s role in 
immigration enforcement by illuminating tax authorities’ role. 
Courts have scrutinized inter-agency information sharing for immigration 
enforcement. In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) promul-
gated a rule pertaining to “no-match” letters that are sent to employers when 
the name and Social Security Number on a W-2 do not match the Social Secu-
rity Administration (SSA) database.162 A “no-match” would occur if, for ex-
ample, an undocumented immigrant submitted another individual’s tax identi-
fication number to their employer.163 Prior to 2006, the implication of a no-
match for immigration status was insignificant, but the 2007 rule attempted to tie 
the “no-match letter” to an employer’s liability for knowingly employing an un-
authorized worker.164 A California district court enjoined the rule, expressed se-
rious concerns as to whether it was arbitrary and capricious, and sided with the 
union plaintiffs on the balance of hardships, particularly the many lawful 
workers who would not be able to resolve a no-match by the new rule’s dead-
line.165 Regulatory efforts to leverage tax identification documents for immi-
gration enforcement en masse have thus been policed by the courts, though 
new efforts have emerged.166 
Taxpayer privacy reflects one specific limitation on inter-agency infor-
mation sharing. The IRS faces specific federal statutory privacy mandates to 
protect tax return information.167 The body of information subject to privacy 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See infra notes 202–214 and accompanying text. 
 161 See, e.g., Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforce-
ment: The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303, 
307 (2010) (arguing that “worksite enforcement . . . has become a regular part of immigration en-
forcement activity”). 
 162 Am. Fed’n of Lab. v. Chertoff, 552 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1001–02 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (describing 
and enjoining this rule). 
 163 Id. at 1002. 
 164 Id. at 1010; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2). 
 165 Am. Fed’n of Lab., 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1006–07. 
 166 The Trump administration tried to revive the practice. See, e.g., Maria Ines Zamudio, Chicago 
Immigrants Losing Jobs Due to No-Match Letters, NPR (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.npr.org/local/
309/2019/08/05/747621735/chicago-immigrants-losing-jobs-due-to-no-match-letters [https://perma.
cc/6SB5-UZVJ]. 
 167 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) (defining “return information” to include “a taxpayer’s identity, the 
nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, 
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protection is construed broadly.168 In one significant lawsuit with immigration 
implications, a foundation sued the SSA after it denied the foundation’s Free-
dom of Information Request for a list of the one hundred employers that gen-
erated the most “no-matches.”169 The D.C. Circuit ultimately sided with the 
SSA, reasoning that, insofar as federal law protects the confidentiality of tax re-
turn data, “[a]n employer’s identity is ‘data.’”170 By defining the taxpayer data 
subject to privacy protection broadly, that case places guardrails on the intersec-
tion of tax and immigration enforcement.171 
Even when the IRS brokers information-sharing agreements, those agree-
ments are narrowly construed.172 An agency’s information-sharing agreement 
with the IRS cannot be extended to a third agency such as the DHS. For exam-
ple, if the SSA properly received information from the IRS, federal law pre-
cludes it from further sharing the information with DHS.173 
Despite legal constraints on bureaucratic information sharing, joint en-
forcement persists. One of the largest immigration workplace raids in the past 
decade, referred to as “the opening bell” of the Trump administration, gave rise 
                                                                                                                           
liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments”); see 
also MING HSU CHEN, PURSUING CITIZENSHIP IN THE ENFORCEMENT ERA 45 (2020) (arguing that the 
IRS “has historically taken privacy very seriously for immigrants and other tax filers”). 
 168 See George K. Yin, Reforming (and Saving) the IRS by Respecting the Public’s Right to Know, 
100 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1124–33 (2014) (chronicling the history of taxpayer return privacy protections, 
from “Civil War income tax laws [that] generally gave the public access to tax return information” to 
the robust protections that emerged at the end of the twentieth century after Nixon administration 
abuses). Yin argues for balancing these protections against meaningful transparency of the govern-
ment’s tax decisions, which requires transparency of the affected taxpayers’ return information. Id. at 
1118. 
 169 Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 701 F.3d 379, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The Social Securi-
ty Administration processes Forms W-2 for the IRS. On occasion, the employee’s name and Social 
Security number as listed on a Form W-2 do not match the SSA’s database. When that happens to a 
sufficient number of employees, the SSA sends the employer a ‘no-match’ letter.”). 
 170 Id. 
 171 The case appears absent from scholarly commentary, as Westlaw produced no law review 
articles that cite to the case. 
 172 IRS Information Sharing Programs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
government-entities/governmental-liaisons/irs-information-sharing-programs (Nov. 4, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/WS5N-AEM3] (noting federal, state, and local information-sharing programs). 
 173 See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(k) (permitting “[d]isclosure of certain returns and return information for 
tax administration purposes”); id. § 6103(l) (permitting “[d]isclosure of returns and return information 
for purposes other than tax administration” (emphasis added)); see also Verity Winship, Enforcement 
Networks, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 274, 290 (2020) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6103 and discussing how the 
statute might preclude SEC/IRS information sharing). Federal law notwithstanding, the ACLU has 
warned that such information sharing may have occurred during the Trump administration. See, e.g., 
Letter from Jennifer Chang Newell, ACLU Immigrs.’ Rts. Project, to Monica Chyn, Pub. FOIA Liai-
son, Soc. Sec. Admin Off. of Priv. & Disclosure, (Apr. 20, 2018) ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
letter/foia-request-ssa [https://perma.cc/9BET-2LNL] [hereinafter ACLU Letter] (requesting records 
concerning information sharing with the DHS). 
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to the ongoing litigation in Zelaya v. Hammer.174 A joint IRS-DHS enforce-
ment action targeted a meatpacking plant, an industry brimming with immi-
grant workers.175 The IRS had procured a search warrant for tax crimes com-
mitted by the plant owner, who had openly described withdrawing hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in cash to pay “undocumented Latino” workers.176 Yet, in 
effectuating the IRS warrant, the tax authorities brought along officers from 
ICE as well as Customs and Border Protection (CBP).177 The “opening bell” 
undergirding Zelaya thus reflected ICE’s own words from a Democratic ad-
ministration decades earlier: “[a]rresting and removing illegal workers must be 
part of a strategy to deter unlawful employment” and immigration.178 
As dozens of armed officers stormed the plant, purportedly to enforce the 
IRS’s warrant, they allegedly engaged in disturbing constitutional violations.179 
The complaint described officers indiscriminately arresting about one hundred 
Latinx workers, with some workers’ earnest efforts to provide their work au-
thorization documents allegedly rebuffed with handcuffs and racial slurs.180 
White workers, by contrast, were left alone but witnessed the events.181 Offic-
ers allegedly went as far as striking Latinx workers in the face with their fists 
and yelling “selfie” while taking a picture of a van filled with detained and 
frightened immigrant workers.182 
Federal authorities punished the owner under tax law and the workers un-
der immigration law. Beyond pleading guilty to tax evasion and knowing em-
ployment of undocumented immigrants, the owner entered into a consent de-
cree with the federal Department of Labor, agreeing to pay damages to dozens 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See 516 F. Supp. 3d 778 (E.D. Tenn. 2021); Zoe Carpenter, When ICE Comes to Town, ROLL-
ING STONE (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/ice-raid-tennessee-
769293/ [https://perma.cc/9TWQ-8C5N]. 
 175 See Angela Stuesse & Nathan T. Dollar, Who Are America’s Meat and Poultry Workers?, ECON. 
POL’Y INST. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.epi.org/blog/meat-and-poultry-worker-demographics/ [https://
perma.cc/ZLL3-RMUT] (providing statistics about the meat and poultry workforce and noting that im-
migrants represent a significant proportion of workers). 
 176 Robert Moore, Southeastern Provision Owner Sentenced to 18 Months, CITIZEN TRIB. (Aug. 
1, 2019), https://www.citizentribune.com/news/local/southeastern-provision-owner-sentenced-to-
months/article_b35cf000-b3c4-11e9-8be5-f72523389472.html [https://perma.cc/33QV-XBM3]. 
 177 Third Amended Complaint ¶ 1, Zelaya, 516 F. Supp. 3d 778 (No. 19-cv-00062), 2019 WL 
5883130 [hereinafter Zelaya, Third Amended Complaint]. 
 178 Memorandum from Marcy M. Forman, Dir., Off. of Investigations, U.S. Immigr. & Customs 
Enf’t to Assistant Dir., Deputy Assistant Dirs. & Special Agents in Charge 1 (Apr. 30, 2009) https://
www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/worksite_enforcement_strategy4_30_2009.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JST9-JUVC]; see Carpenter, supra note 174. 
 179 Zelaya, Third Amended Complaint, supra note 177, ¶ 1. 
 180 Id. ¶¶ 3, 143, 162. 
 181 Id. ¶ 147. 
 182 Id. ¶¶ 189, 211. 
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of workers for violations of wage and hour protections.183 Some undocumented 
workers were federally convicted of illegal re-entry and deported,184 an exam-
ple of how criminalizing immigration-related offenses provides federal prose-
cutors “leverage to seek convictions in cases arising out of worksite raids.”185 
Zelaya is a uniquely tax-based instance of a broader phenomenon of workplace 
immigration enforcement leading to worker convictions.186 
The workers, unmentioned in the IRS warrant but targeted under immi-
gration law, sued for violations of their constitutional rights. As the court ex-
plained, although “the affidavit referenced the suspected presence of undocu-
mented immigrants at the [p]lant, it did not discuss—and the warrant did not 
authorize—the seizure, detention, or arrest of any individual, undocumented or 
otherwise.”187 
Zelaya’s claims include violations of the workers’ Fourth Amendment 
rights prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure188 and Fifth Amendment 
equal protection rights.189 The case remains in the federal court system, after 
years of litigation. Some plaintiffs remain lawfully present, while others were 
deported.190 
The Government’s lackluster arguments in its motion to dismiss ignore 
migrants’ rights. For example, the Government argues that a plaintiff who lacks 
lawful status “ha[s] no right not to be detained.”191 At its most basic level, the 
very case that the Government cites predicates that assertion on the absence of 
                                                                                                                           
 183 Scalia v. Se. Provision, LLC, No. 19-cv-00150, at *2–3 (E.D. Tenn. July 6, 2020) (Bloomberg 
Law). 
 184 Moore, supra note 176. 
 185 See generally Saucedo, supra note 161, at 308 (discussing ICE’s role in workplace immigra-
tion enforcement). 
 186 516 F. Supp. 3d 778 (E.D. Tenn. 2021); Angela D. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, Equitable 
Enforcement, and Exploited Immigrant Workers, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 299, 320 n.174 
(2017). 
 187 Zelaya, 516 F. Supp. 3d at 787; Class Action Jury Demand Exhibit 1: IRS Search Warrant, 
Zelaya, 516 F. Supp. 3d 778 (No. 19-cv-00062). 
 188 Zelaya, Third Amended Complaint, supra note 177, ¶¶ 225–233. 
 189 Id. ¶¶ 217–224. 
 190 Travis Dorman, Bean Station Slaughterhouse Raided by ICE Ordered to Pay Workers 
$610,000, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (July 9, 2020), https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/local/
2020/07/09/bean-station-slaughterhouse-raided-ice-must-pay-workers-610000/5399508002/ [https://
perma.cc/F6QM-UEX5]. 
 191 DHS Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Joint Motion for Partial Dismissal 
at 11, Zelaya, 516 F. Supp. 3d 778 (No. 19-cv-62), 2019 WL 5883131 (quoting De La Paz v. Coy, 786 
F.3d 367, 379 (5th Cir. 2015)); see also Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1281, 1315–16 (2010) (criticizing government arguments “that it may stop, detain, and interro-
gate without individualized suspicion in the context of worksite enforcement”). 
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“unconstitutional physical abuse,”192 allegations that are at the very heart of 
plaintiffs’ allegations.193 Second, the statement grossly misstates existing doc-
trine by implying that the lack of lawful status means that an individual can be 
subject to detention, or even arrested, at any time, without any concern for the 
method or subject.194 As the Ninth Circuit wrote in 2019, in Perez Cruz v. 
Barr, ICE agents may not “carry out preplanned mass detentions, interroga-
tions, and arrests at the factory, without individualized reasonable suspi-
cion.”195 In both Zelaya and Perez Cruz, ICE appears to have “intended from 
the outset to turn the execution of these warrants into quite a different opera-
tion than a search for employment [or tax] records.”196 Although uncommitted 
to migrants’ constitutional rights, the government appears committed to con-
scripting tax authorities to police them. 
Zelaya and other judicial decisions are unlikely to preclude joint immigra-
tion-tax enforcement, even as they potentially limit unconstitutional extremes. 
United States law prohibits Fourth Amendment violations of undocumented 
immigrants’ rights during ICE officers’ enforcement activities.197 Zelaya tries 
                                                                                                                           
 192 De La Paz, 786 F.3d at 379. The district court explained that De La Paz supports the viability 
of claims against “‘immigration officers who deploy unconstitutionally excessive force . . . .’” Zelaya, 
516 F. Supp. 3d at 808 (citing to and quoting De La Paz, 786 F.3d at 374). 
 193 See supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing allegations of physical abuse). 
 194 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 718 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[Noncitizens] are 
entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause. Liberty under the Due Process Clause includes 
protection against unlawful or arbitrary personal restraint or detention.”); see also David Cole, In Aid 
of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1036–39 (2002) 
(discussing these protections and how they may differ for noncitizens stopped at the border versus 
those who reside in the interior). 
 195 926 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2019). Two notable similarities unite Perez Cruz and Zelaya. 
First, both cases begin with government authorities procuring relatively narrow warrants focused on 
employer records and a few named individuals. Compare id. (describing warrants for “employment-
related documents” and a few named individuals), with Class Action Jury Demand Exhibit 1: IRS 
Search Warrant, supra note 187, at 5–6 (describing documents and items to be seized), and Class 
Action Jury Demand Exhibit 2: Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant at 6, Zelaya, 516 F. Supp. 3d 
778 (No. 19-cv-00062) (naming James Brantley, Pamela Brantley, Kelsey Brantley, and Priscilla 
Keck). Second, despite these narrow warrants, the raids in both cases arguably manifest an underlying 
purpose for mass detention of hundreds of workers. The purposes are apparent from officers’ prepara-
tion, including arranging transportation and instrumentalities of detention, whether through officer 
quantity or physical restraints. Compare Perez Cruz, 926 F.3d at 1133 (describing the preparation as 
including “‘2 buses and 5 vans’ ready to transport potential detainees”), with supra notes 179–182 and 
accompanying text (describing the force used by immigration officials). 
 196 Perez Cruz, 926 F.3d at 1133. 
 197 See Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 F.3d 172, 183 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A]ssuming that ICE officers did 
not secure voluntary consent to enter the home—thereby effecting the basic Fourth Amendment viola-
tion that must underlie any egregious violation—certain aspects of the raid as alleged . . . transform 
the constitutional transgression depicted here into an egregious Fourth Amendment violation.”). But 
see Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984) (holding that “the 
exclusionary rule need not be applied” to “an admission of unlawful presence in this country made 
subsequent to an allegedly unlawful arrest” in a civil deportation hearing). 
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to affirm these rights, preserving a plaintiff’s excessive force-Fourth Amend-
ment claim based on being “allegedly punched . . . in the face without provoca-
tion” and holding that dismissal on qualified immunity grounds was “unwar-
ranted.”198 Even as the court preserved some of the plaintiffs’ claims against 
government authorities, it found that the plaintiffs failed to plead a constitu-
tional violation in the IRS agents’ efforts to obtain the search warrant.199 The 
court affirmed that, where there is probable cause of federal tax violations, no 
cause of action lay against the IRS and its agents “just because another agency 
allegedly exploited the warrant to conduct its own search and seizure.”200 Ze-
laya thus protects the tax authorities’ participation in immigration enforcement, 
while guarding against unconstitutional abuses by the immigration agencies 
and officers.201 
Despite the government’s failures in Zelaya, appropriately specific war-
rants preserve the possibility of joint immigration-tax enforcement.202 For ex-
ample, a warrant could facilitate ICE detention of immigrants so long as indi-
vidualized reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence exists (or for arrest, 
probable cause).203 The warrant needs only to be “reasonably specific,” not 
                                                                                                                           
 198 Zelaya, 516 F. Supp. 3d at 807–10 (preserving Plaintiff Guerrero’s excessive force claim un-
der the Fourth Amendment claim based on being “allegedly punched . . . in the face without provoca-
tion”). The court also declined to dismiss the false arrest claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
reserving the question of whether immigration authorities’ use of the IRS warrant to detain the plain-
tiffs was lawful. Id. at 811–13 (“[S]tate-law elements of false arrest are unrelated to the availability of 
a Bivens remedy. Neither party cites Tennessee case law addressing false arrest of undocumented 
aliens, and the Court’s independent research has not identified any.”). 
 199 Id. at 802. 
 200 Id. at 801. 
 201 The Zelaya court also apologetically explained that it “c[ould] not extend a Bivens remedy to 
Plaintiffs’ equal-protection claim under the Fifth Amendment” for the ICE officers allegedly detaining 
all Latinx workers and exempting white workers. Id. at 795–96. The court explained how a number of 
twenty-first century Supreme Court decisions militate towards limiting Bivens. Id. at 795 (first citing 
Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020); and then citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017)). 
 202 Cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (“[I]ndiscriminate searches and seizures 
conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the fram-
ing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 203 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b) (2021) (permitting “[i]nterrogation and detention not amounting 
to arrest . . . (2) [i]f the immigration officer has a reasonable suspicion”); id. § 287.8(c)(2)(i) (“An 
arrest shall be made only when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the per-
son to be arrested has committed an offense against the United States or is an alien illegally in the 
United States.”); see also Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 216 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Courts have 
consistently held that the ‘reason to believe’ phrase . . . ‘must be read in light of constitutional stand-
ards, so that “reason to believe” must be considered the equivalent of probable cause.’” (quoting Au 
Yi Lau v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). To be clear, 
simply accepting employment without work authorization, so long as it is done without fraud, should 
not give rise to reasonable suspicion of violating immigration law, much less criminal law. This is 
particularly true in Zelaya, where the workers were paid in cash, suggesting the employer evaded the 
W-2 and may not have even asked for work authorization. See 516 F. Supp. 3d at 788. On the other 
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“elaborately detailed,”204 but suspicions cannot be discriminatorily extended to 
neighbors based on proximity alone.205 Thus, future warrants can facilitate 
joint enforcement, particularly assuming more competent officers than ap-
peared in Zelaya.206 Because employers’ tax-reporting obligations rely on em-
ployees’ Social Security Numbers (or lack thereof), an employer suspected of 
hiring unauthorized workers will often generate corresponding suspicions of 
tax non-compliance. Judicial review of the scope of a warrant prevents “a gen-
eral, exploratory rummaging”207 and unfounded, mass migrant detentions, of-
ten of Latinx migrants.208 It does not, however, prevent joint immigration-tax 
enforcement writ large. 
The cooperation of tax authorities in workplace immigration enforcement 
may increase. In the late-twentieth century, Congress authorized officers from 
multiple agencies to audit employers’ retention of employment eligibility veri-
fication forms (the I-9).209 DHS has reported on the annual rise in “worksite 
enforcement operations,” with the actual number of enforcement-related ac-
tions tripling to over 6,000 in recent years, from an average of less than 2,000 
in Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017.210 Despite the purported focus on employer 
                                                                                                                           
hand, if there is independent reason to believe that the immigrant presented false documents for pro-
curing employment, that could provide reasonable grounds for detention. Id.  
 204 United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir.1982). 
 205 See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 86, 91 (1979) (“[A] person’s mere propinquity to 
others independently suspected . . . does not, without more, give rise to probable cause . . . .”). “Alt-
hough the search warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to search the prem-
ises and to search [the proprietor,] it gave them no authority whatever to invade the constitutional 
protections possessed individually by the tavern’s customers.” Id. at 92; see also Kati L. Griffith, 
Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at 
Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 444 (2011) (emphasizing “Congress’s extensive consideration 
of employment-discrimination policy as part of immigration reform,” both through antidiscrimination 
protections in the Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) and preexisting protections in 
Title VII). 
 206 516 F. Supp. 3d at 789–90. “The Fourth Amendment [only] requires that a search warrant 
‘particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’” United States 
v. Bridges, 344 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 207 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). 
 208 Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1089–91 (2008) (arguing against “dragnet” enforcement and how “[j]udicial pre-
approval becomes a mere procedural formality when warrants do not require particularized suspi-
cion”); Kevin R. Johnson, Trump’s Latinx Repatriation, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1444, 1451 (2019) (de-
scribing how raids “target employers known to rely on low-wage undocumented Latinx immigrants”). 
 209 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3)–(6); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2 (2021) (describing and establishing the I-9); 
Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 194 (characterizing IRCA as marking “the first time in our nation’s histo-
ry [that] employment of undocumented immigrants [was made] unlawful”). 
 210 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT BUDGET OVER-
VIEW FISCAL YEAR 2021 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 7 (2021) [hereinafter ICE BUDGET OVER-
VIEW FY 2021]; see also Tal Kopan, ICE Chief Pledges Quadrupling or More of Workplace Crack-
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compliance, including through the criminal arrest of employers,211 ICE has 
increasingly revealed that it disproportionately focuses its workplace enforce-
ment arrests on employees, not employers.212 In arresting immigrant employees 
to “promote [a] culture of employer compliance,” ICE intends to “cooperate 
more closely with external partners, including . . . [the] IRS.”213 In coordination 
with tax authorities, immigration audits and raids may increasingly punish work-
ers, not just employers.214 
In short, whether through technical statutory exclusions or armed collabo-
rations between tax authorities and DHS, tax law continues to police migrants. 
Courts confront constitutional litigation challenging this phenomenon in its 
varied forms. Even if they curb outlying “raids” and attendant violations of 
constitutional rights, courts cannot eliminate tax law’s policing of migrants. 
III. MIGRATION AND MOBILITY CONSEQUENCES OF TAX COMPLIANCE 
Just as tax law polices migrants, so do mobility and migration laws enable 
tax enforcement. This Part explores the ways in which tax compliance impacts 
the mobility of both citizens and noncitizens. After reviewing mobility-related 
                                                                                                                           
downs, CNN (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/17/politics/ice-crackdown-workplaces/
index.html [https://perma.cc/F3UH-SD4G]. 
 211 ICE BUDGET OVERVIEW FY 2021, supra note 210, at 7; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT FISCAL YEAR 2021 CON-
GRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 96 (2021) [hereinafter OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT FY 2021]; U.S. IMMIGR. 
& CUSTOMS ENF’T, WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT: GUIDE TO ADMINISTRATIVE FORM I-9 INSPECTIONS 
AND CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES 2 (2008) (“[C]riminal prosecutions, seizure of assets, and the im-
position of meaningful civil penalties upon those employers and businesses that utilize and profit from 
the labor of unauthorized [noncitizens] is the most effective deterrent.” (emphasis added)). Recently, 
the DHS Inspector General made the strident argument that “the I-9 Guide has not been updated to 
address risks and challenges,” including that “ICE officials cannot ensure that these unapprehended 
individuals do not have criminal records and the [unauthorized noncitizen workers] are free to seek 
employment elsewhere.” OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-21-15, ICE GUIDANCE NEEDS IMPROVE-
MENT TO DETER ILLEGAL EMPLOYMENT 5 (2021). 
 212 OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT FY 2021, supra note 211, at 96 (describing how the “worksite 
enforcement strategy” uses “criminal arrests of employers and administrative arrest of employees,” 
and in fiscal year 2019, the strategy resulted in “2,048 administrative arrests and 627 criminal ar-
rests”); see also OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-14-33, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCE-
MENT’S WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTION PROCESS 3–4 (2014) (“Of the more 
than 6,000 WSE-related arrests made in 2008 under the previous strategy, only 135 were arrests of 
employers.”). 
 213 OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT FY 2021, supra note 211, at 97 
 214 In fact, ICE ramped up its workplace enforcement by envisioning a world where “the integrity 
of [employers’] employment records is just as important to the federal government as the integrity of 
their tax files . . . .” U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, ICE Delivers More Than 5,200 I-9 Audit Notices 
to Businesses Across the US in 2-Phase Nationwide Operation (July 24, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/
news/releases/ice-delivers-more-5200-i-9-audit-notices-businesses-across-us-2-phase-nationwide 
[https://perma.cc/N3AY-JC59]. 
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penalties for tax noncompliance in Section A,215 I describe the ways that the 
prospect of immigration benefits incentivizes noncitizens’ tax compliance in 
Section B.216 
A. Penalties for Noncompliance 
For noncitizens, including permanent residents, tax noncompliance may 
lead to deportation. A criminal conviction for the willful attempt to evade a tax 
by filing a false return can constitute an “aggravated felony” for the purposes 
of the INA and lead to deportation.217 In Kawashima v. Holder, the U.S. Su-
preme Court articulated an even broader view of the types of tax offenses that 
could render a foreign national subject to deportation.218 Although the Ka-
washimas’ conviction stemmed from falsifying a tax return, the Court explained 
that “a taxpayer who files a truthful tax return, but who also takes affirmative 
steps to evade payment by moving his assets beyond the reach of the [IRS]” 
would also be at risk of deportation for such a conviction.219 Through Kawashi-
ma, the Court strengthened the “tax-immigration nexus” from the twentieth 
century and confirmed a broad class of tax-based “aggravated felonies” for the 
twenty-first century.220 These significant civil collateral consequences for a 
noncitizen’s criminal tax evasion mean that undocumented delinquent taxpay-
ers may be forced to leave the country. 
For citizens, the federal tax code now shapes the mobility of tax evaders 
through U.S. passport controls.221 U.S. passports are generally made available 
only to U.S. citizens.222 After a government report documented the leisurely 
travels of tax evaders, the seeds were sown for tax-based restrictions on pass-
                                                                                                                           
 215 See infra notes 217–260 and accompanying text. 
 216 See infra notes 261–271 and accompanying text. 
 217 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (defining a tax felony); Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 480 (2012) 
(upholding removability of legal permanent residents convicted of “willfully making and subscribing 
a false tax return” and “aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return” in respective viola-
tions of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2)). See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) 
(providing that certain tax evasion offenses constitute an “aggravated felony” for purposes of nonciti-
zen removal). 
 218 565 U.S. at 488 (concluding “that the specific inclusion of tax evasion . . . does not implicitly 
remove all other tax offenses from the scope of [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)’s] plain language”). 
 219 Id. at 480, 488. 
 220 Davis, supra note 8, at 206. One constraint on the tax crimes is the statutory requirement that 
the “loss to the government” must exceed a certain amount. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii). 
 221 26 U.S.C. § 7345. Passports are available to U.S. citizens and noncitizen American nationals. 
Id. 
 222 American nationals, who some have called “interstitial citizens,” may also be eligible. Rose 
Cuison Villazor, American Nationals and Interstitial Citizenship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1673, 1676 
n.11, 1678 (2017) (discussing access to passports for American nationals). American nationals do not 
usually have federal filing obligations. 
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port issuance.223 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found 
that over one percent of passport applicants in a given year owed tax debts, col-
lectively totaling billions of dollars.224 Additionally, in carefully reviewing a 
sample of twenty-five of the most “egregious” cases,225 the GAO found thirteen 
individuals with unpaid federal taxes exceeding a million dollars each.226 The 
IRS had already filed tax liens against all thirteen delinquent individuals’ per-
sonal property, and many of them—a group that included lawyers and CEOs—
regularly traveled outside the country.227 The IRS exposed a not-so-noble tax-
dodging nobility—American citizens living jet set cross-border lives with appar-
ently little interest in settling their tax debts.228 
The unsettling picture led Congress to search for new enforcement mech-
anisms, building a bridge between tax and migration. In 2015, Congress de-
vised an enforcement bridge, spanning the Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) 
and the Department of State.229 If a taxpayer’s debt exceeds fifty thousand dol-
lars, and the taxpayer has failed to enter into a payment agreement with the 
IRS,230 the IRS may, through Treasury, share that information with the Depart-
ment of State, leading to passport nonrenewal or revocation.231 Treasury’s certi-
fication of a seriously delinquent tax debt leaves the Department of State with 
little discretion to issue passports that enable these taxpayers to leave the coun-
try, even temporarily.232 Absent “emergency circumstances or humanitarian rea-
sons,” the delinquent taxpayer is confined stateside.233 Although in some ways 
                                                                                                                           
 223 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-272, FEDERAL TAX COLLECTION: 
POTENTIAL FOR USING PASSPORT ISSUANCE TO INCREASE COLLECTION OF UNPAID TAXES (2011) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 224 Id. at 4. 
 225 Id. at 18. 
 226 Id. at 11–14, 21–22. 
 227 Id. at 11–13, 21–22. 
 228 See Betty Behrens, Nobles, Privileges and Taxes in France at the End of the Ancien Régime, 
15 ECON. HIST. REV. 451, 453 (1963) (describing “exemption from the servile obligations of the 
taille” for eighteenth-century French nobility). 
 229 Maehr v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 5 F.4th 1100, 1104–05 (10th Cir. 2021) (describing the provi-
sion’s legislative history and upholding it against constitutional challenge). 
 230 26 U.S.C. § 7345(b). The amount is adjusted regularly for inflation. Id. § 7345(f). 
 231 Id. § 7345(a). To be clear, although the scheme “use[s] the threat of passport revocation as an 
incentive for tax compliance[,] [n]o direct connection between tax delinquency and international trav-
el, such as evidence the delinquent taxpayer is secreting assets overseas, is required to effect a pass-
port revocation.” Maehr, 5 F.4th  at 1105 (citing Michael S. Kirsch, Conditioning Citizenship Benefits 
on Satisfying Citizenship Obligations, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1701, 1712). 
 232 22 C.F.R. § 51.60(h) (2021) (noting that the Department of State “may not issue a passport . . . 
in any [such] case” (emphasis added)). 
 233 Id. Because of an American passport’s identification and mobility power, even citizens already 
abroad and with little interest in returning to the United States may find it difficult to function without 
one. Kirsch, supra note 231, at 1715–16. 
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novel, this tax debt-based restriction on international mobility builds upon ear-
lier consequences for tax debts.234 
Restricting U.S. citizens’ movement based on outstanding debts is not 
wholly new. The Department of State has long possessed authority to reject 
passport applications for outstanding child support obligations.235 In that con-
text, however, state agencies provide the certificate, given the family law con-
text, whereas the Treasury does so here, for serious federal tax delinquency.236 
Additionally, partly because the child support provision dates back to the late-
twentieth century, the attendant procedural rights have been judicially clarified. 
A federal hearing prior to a child support-based passport revocation is not nec-
essary.237 The tax-based passport revocation’s relatively recent introduction 
suggests future procedural clarification will occur, as audits and recommenda-
tions arise.238 
Taxpayer privacy does not impede passport revocation. Although federal 
law precludes IRS officials from disclosing taxpayer return information,239 the 
2015 law authorized a new information transfer to the Department of State and 
new consequences for delinquent taxpayers.240 This necessarily discreet federal 
certification differs from California’s public shaming-driver’s license suspen-
sion combination discussed below.241 
The scope of the mobility control of delinquent taxpayers is nontrivial. 
The IRS estimated that 362,000 people would be affected by the new law, 
                                                                                                                           
 234 See generally Eric Lopresti, What’s Wrong with Strict Liability and Nonmonetary Penalties? 
The Case for Reasonable Fault-Based Civil Tax Penalties and Procedural Protections, 72 TAX LAW. 
589, 606 n.64 (2019) (canvassing state statutes with licensing and other consequences for failure to 
comply with tax laws). 
 235 42 U.S.C. § 652(k). 
 236 Id. §§ 652(k), 654(31). 
 237 Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the decision of the district 
court because the “right to pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to contest the arrears determina-
tion before the relevant state agency is adequate to protect plaintiff’s liberty interest in having a pass-
port and traveling internationally”); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 223, at 1 (noting how “[s]ince 
the program was initiated in 1998 [through the report date in 2011], about $200 million ha[d] been 
collected on child support obligations”). 
 238 See generally TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2019-30-068, IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE PASSPORT PROVISIONS OF THE FAST ACT WAS GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE INTER-
NAL REVENUE SERVICE IS WORKING ON OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR PASSPORT REVOCATIONS (2019) 
(providing an audit of over 300,000 certified taxpayers and making recommendations for the evalua-
tion process when selecting cases for sending to the State Department for passport revocation). 
 239 26 U.S.C. § 6103. This binds both the IRS and agencies, like the SSA, that may have a valid 
reason to obtain, but not share, the IRS data. Id. 
 240 See id. § 7345(a). 
 241 See infra notes 256–257 and accompanying text. See generally Blank, supra note 8, at 772 (“A 
potential drawback of collateral tax sanctions is that they could cause individuals to fear that govern-
ment agencies and officials other than the taxing authority will gain access to their personal tax return 
information.”). 
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shortly after its enforcement began in 2018.242 The total amount recovered 
from taxpayers who the IRS certified to the State Department as being serious-
ly delinquent exceeds one billion dollars, with the average length of delin-
quency for certified taxpayers approaching seven years.243 Although the data at 
this point remains preliminary, the IRS has found taxpayers settle their debts to 
avoid passport interference.244 
Lastly, for citizens, consider the striking ways that tax law can actually 
promote permanent emigration. Mobility taken to its end means not only long-
term migration, but also irreversible renunciation of citizenship, which tax pol-
icy can make either appealing or difficult.245 Although immigration law often 
views citizenship as a significant privilege, tax law exposes how people can 
become encumbered by their citizenship.246 The Foreign Account Tax Compli-
ance Act (FATCA) has increased compliance monitoring of U.S. citizens, who, 
because they are taxed on their worldwide income, have attendant filing re-
quirements.247 The IRS publishes a list of individuals who expatriate and re-
nounce their citizenship quarterly, as required by federal law.248 In this way, 
                                                                                                                           
 242 Laura Saunders, Thousands of Americans Will Be Denied a Passport Because of Unpaid Tax-
es, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/thousands-of-americans-will-be-denied-
a-passport-because-of-unpaid-taxes-1530869401 [https://perma.cc/T62G-X2QV]. 
 243 Update on Passport Certifications and Taxpayer Advocate Service, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
(Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/update-on-passport-certifications-and-taxpayer-advocate-
service [https://perma.cc/53FX-MNDA]. 
 244 See, e.g., Daniel McCarthy, State Department Begins to Deny Passports to Tax Debtors, 
TRAVEL MKT. REP., https://www.travelmarketreport.com/articles/State-Department-Begins-to-Deny-
Passports-to-Tax-Debtors [https://perma.cc/ZEE9-MWGY] (discussing “recent reports” of passport 
denials and revocations). 
 245 The Reed Amendment to the INA makes that renunciation of citizenship permanent by render-
ing the tax-motivated renounce inadmissible under immigration law. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(E) (“Any 
alien who is a former citizen of the United States who officially renounces United States citizenship 
and who is determined by the Attorney General to have renounced United States citizenship for the 
purpose of avoiding taxation by the United States is inadmissible.”); see also Michael S. Kirsch, Al-
ternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a 
Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863, 891–92 (2004) (describing the history of the 
Reed Amendment). 
 246 See, e.g., In re Miegel, 272 F. 688, 690 (E.D. Mich. 1921) (noting “the coveted goal of citi-
zenship”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 282–85 (1994) (com-
menting on Gerald Neuman’s work on citizenship and entertaining various models of citizenship and 
citizenship law to ask, more fundamentally, “[w]hat is accomplished by having a citizenship concept 
at all?”). 
 247 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, Pub. L. No. 111–147, §§ 501–531, 124 
Stat. 71, 97–113 (2010) (codified in various sections of the Internal Revenue Code); see also Kirsch, 
supra note 231, at 1716–17 (summarizing FATCA’s reporting obligations and attendant penalties); 
Noam Noked, FATCA, CRS, and the Wrong Choice of Who to Regulate, 22 FLA. TAX REV. 77, 79 
(2018) (describing the first federal prosecution for a conspiracy to avoid FATCA reporting). 
 248 See, e.g., Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required 
by Section 6039G, 84 Fed. Reg. 61,137 (Nov. 12, 2019). This list also includes long-term residents, 
defined in Internal Revenue Code 877(e), who end their United States resident status for federal tax 
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tax law has determined that formally disappearing from the United States’ tax 
rolls and political community requires public notice of one’s exit. 
Tax-based restrictions on wealthy citizens elicit little sympathy, but re-
strictions can burden those in already challenging circumstances. In one nota-
ble case, a man with disabilities born to U.S. citizens living in Canada was un-
able to renounce his citizenship.249 His ongoing U.S. citizenship led to con-
cerns that U.S. taxation would erode accounts that his parents established for 
his long-term care and that were free from Canadian taxation.250 The tax quan-
dary stems from U.S. citizenship law’s limiting of renunciation to those able to 
form the requisite legal “intent.”251 One tax scholar characterized the case as 
“an inescapable result of permanently tying taxation to citizenship,” reflective 
of the underappreciated “interplay of immigration rules with taxation.”252 The 
odd interactions of U.S. citizenship and immigration laws with its tax system 
turned the “dream” of citizenship into one family’s nightmare.253 
                                                                                                                           
purposes. 26 U.S.C. § 877(e). Some countries also publish the reverse—lists of newly-naturalized 
citizens. See Dimitry Kochenov, Oskar J. Gstrein & Jacquelyn D. Veraldi, The Naturalization-Privacy 
Interface: Publication of Personal Data of New European Union Citizens Versus European Privacy 
Standards, 42 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 237, 253–57 (2020) (arguing that “more and more countries view the 
publication of the newly-naturalized citizens’ private data as a problem” and describing how European 
countries in particular have amended their laws accordingly). For an unsurprising glimpse, “the Cyp-
riot lists contained plenty of interesting names, including powerful oligarchs from the former Soviet 
Union, Chinese tycoons, and scions of prominent dictatorial families from all around the world.” Id. at 
243.  
 249 Amber Hildebrandt, U.S. FATCA Tax Law Catches Unsuspecting Canadians in Its Crosshairs, 
CBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/u-s-fatca-tax-law-catches-unsuspecting-
canadians-in-its-crosshairs-1.2493864 [https://perma.cc/B4RL-246E]. 
 250 Id. 
 251 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Minors, Incompetents, Prisoners, Plea Bargains, Cults and Other Spe-
cial Circumstances, in 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 1290–1298 (explaining that “[b]ecause loss 
of U.S. nationality occurs only when a would-be renunciant or person signing a statement of voluntary 
relinquishment has the legal capacity to form the specific intent necessary to lose U.S. nationality, 
cases involving persons with established or possible mental incapacity require careful review [includ-
ing] mental disability, mental illness, developmental impairment, Alzheimer’s disease, and similar 
conditions [and possibly] substance abuse”). To the detriment of those situated like the Canadian man 
described by Hildebrandt, the manual also declares that “[a] formal finding of mental incompetency 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in the United States or abroad, precludes a finding that 
an individual has the requisite intent.” Id. § 1293. 
 252 Allison Christians, A Global Perspective on Citizenship-Based Taxation, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
193, 214 (2017). 
 253 See Hildebrandt, supra note 249; see, e.g., American Dream and Promise Act of 2019, H.R. 6, 
116th Cong. (2019) (providing for a pathway to citizenship to Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) recipients); Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 87, at 1227 (foregrounding the discussion of 
sanctuary with an explanation of the presidential rescission of DACA and the affected “DREAMers”). 
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Tax delinquents may also find themselves unable to take the driver’s seat 
based on their state tax delinquency.254 In many states, including California, 
driver’s licenses are available without regard to immigration status.255 States 
differ in how they calculate, publicize, and penalize delinquent taxpayers. Cali-
fornia, for example, posts a list of the top five hundred greatest past-due bal-
ances on the Franchise Tax Board’s website, and those listed may have their 
driver’s licenses suspended.256 The most recent minimum amount to make the 
top five hundred was over $150,000.257 In contrast, Louisiana and New York 
set absolute, rather than relative, minimum thresholds of only $1,000 and 
$10,000 for driver’s license suspensions, respectively.258 Louisiana’s suspen-
sion is premised only on income tax, while New York’s is broader and includes 
delinquent property taxes.259 Due to the differing bases for calculating delin-
quency, a mere $1,000 tax debt can deprive a Louisianan of the ability to take 
the open road, while for Californians, a $100,000 debt would not. These ex-
press tax delinquency thresholds place a price on what taxpayers can get away 
with and still be able to get away. 
                                                                                                                           
 254 Blank, supra note 8, at 740 (noting that “[t]he collateral tax sanction of revoking driver’s li-
censes from tax-delinquent individuals has flourished because states have found that it is effective” 
and providing a New York press release from Governor Cuomo as evidence). 
 255 See generally Ann Morse, Susan Frederick & Ben Husch, State Driver’s Licenses and Immi-
grants, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/blog/2020/02/14/
state-drivers-licenses-and-immigrants.aspx [https://perma.cc/5JLW-JPZT]; Jack B. Weinstein, The 
Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lec-
ture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 41 n.145 (2008) (arguing for a connection between constitutional equal 
protection principles and the protections that long-term noncitizens should be offered, including ac-
cess to driver’s licenses). 
 256 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 494.5(b)(1) (West 2021) (explaining that “‘Certified list’ means 
either the list provided by the State Board of Equalization or the list provided by the Franchise Tax 
Board of persons whose names appear on the lists of the 500 largest tax delinquencies”); CAL. VEH. 
CODE § 34623.1 (West 2020); Top 500 Past Due Balances, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., https://www.
ftb.ca.gov/about-ftb/newsroom/top-500-past-due-balances/index.html (July 15, 2020) [https://perma.
cc/3BTZ-BM5D]. 
 257 Personal Income Tax List: Top 500 Tax Delinquencies, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., https://
www.ftb.ca.gov/about-ftb/newsroom/top-500-past-due-balances/personal-income-tax-list.html (Aug. 
19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/U2KW-QAUA]. 
 258 LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:296.2(A) (2005) (“A suspension and renewal of a driver’s license shall 
be denied if the Department of Revenue has an assessment or judgment against an individual that has 
become final and nonappealable if the amount of the final assessment or final judgment is in excess of 
one thousand dollars of individual income tax . . . .” (emphasis added)); N.Y. TAX LAW § 171-v(1) 
(McKinney 2019) (allowing for “the suspension of drivers’ licenses of taxpayers with past-due tax 
liabilities equal to or in excess of ten thousand dollars”). The New York Governor unsuccessfully 
tried to lower the threshold to five thousand dollars. Governor Cuomo Announces Additional 
Measures to Crack Down on Tax Scofflaws Included in Budget, N.Y. STATE (Feb. 9, 2015), https://
www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-additional-measures-crack-down-tax-
scofflaws-included-budget [https://perma.cc/4AFW-Z9W3]. 
 259 Supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
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Denials and revocations of federally-issued passports and state-issued li-
censes illustrate how migration and mobility rights are now attached to tax 
compliance. Migration restrictions appear in tax enforcement’s arsenal, but 
migration status is also a basis for determining which restriction to use. 
Against the portraits of wealthy taxpayers, whether renouncing American citi-
zenship for tax havens or ignoring their tax obligations, lie the undocumented 
taxpayers who hope their compliance will earn them the right to lawful sta-
tus.260 
B. Benefits of Tax Compliance 
The prospective migration benefits of tax compliance manifest in dual 
ways: through both immediate tax credit relief and longer-term possibilities of 
regularization. Both are premised on the fact that undocumented taxpayers 
have federal and state taxpayer obligations to the United States and their re-
spective state government based on their residence, even if that residence is 
unlawful.261 As a reminder, pandemic relief was denied to undocumented im-
migrants for consecutive rounds at the federal level.262 Nonetheless, undocu-
mented taxpayers’ compliance may reap both a short-term financial benefit and 
a long-term immigration benefit: adjustment of status. 
The potential short-term benefit for tax compliance lies with state Earned 
Income Tax Credits (EITC). The federal EITC was available to undocumented 
immigrants prior to 1996, but that is no longer the case.263 California recently 
                                                                                                                           
 260 Although such tax compliance responds to legal incentives and punishments, it may also re-
flect a more basic desire to avoid being perceived as “one of the immigrants . . . who’s described as a 
burden on the system.” See, e.g., Joey Palacios, Immigrants Working Illegally in the U.S. File Tax 
Returns Without the Fear of Deportation, TEX. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.tpr.org/
border-immigration/2015-04-17/immigrants-working-illegally-in-the-u-s-file-tax-returns-without-the-
fear-of-deportation [https://perma.cc/6U4U-RWET] (quoting a woman identified by the pseudonym 
“Claudia” who arrived from Mexico and overstayed her tourist visa). 
 261 See, e.g., Lipman, supra note 9 (detailing these obligations); Introduction to Residency Under 
U.S. Tax Law, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/
introduction-to-residency-under-us-tax-law (Aug. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ZN3F-TBMJ] (explain-
ing how tax law uses the IRS’s definition of “residency,” as opposed to citizenship, to determine fed-
eral tax obligations). For a trenchant discussion of how terms like “unlawful,” “undocumented,” and 
“unauthorized” can confuse the spectrum of immigration statuses, and their specific privileges, see 
Heeren, supra note 109, at 1126. 
 262 See supra Section II.A. 
 263 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 451, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 32(c)(1)(E), (c)(3)(D), (m); see also Francine J. Lipman, Bearing Witness to Economic Injustices of 
Undocumented Immigrant Families: A New Class of “Undeserving” Poor, 7 NEV. L.J. 736, 746–51 
(2007) (describing how Congress limited EITC relief for authorized work and characterizing the poli-
cy as “irrational tax treatment of hard-working poor undocumented immigrant families”). 
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expanded its state-refundable EITC to undocumented immigrants,264 with other 
states on its heels.265 The design of these state expansions are not without com-
plicated legal questions, including whether a state can offer a tax-based financial 
incentive for employment deemed illegal by federal statute.266 The contours of 
that preemption analysis have not yet been defined.267 Assuming the credits are 
found legal, state EITC availability would allow low-income undocumented 
taxpayers, particularly those with children, to file their state taxes, and poten-
tially receive state refunds. 
Citizenship remains the long-term benefit. Naturalization requires “good 
moral character,” a determination often influenced by tax compliance.268 Im-
migration reform proposals in Congress often explicitly premise the ability for 
undocumented immigrants to obtain a green card on evidence of tax compli-
ance.269 Thus, undocumented immigrants may choose to comply with tax law 
in expectation that any prospective reform will require retrospective tax com-
pliance. 
In both cases, intense immigration enforcement coupled with attendant al-
legations of illegal information sharing may deter compliance by privacy-
                                                                                                                           
 264 Assemb. B. 1876 § 1(p)(2), 2020–21 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (replacing “social security 
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government/capitol-alert/article212753674.html [https://perma.cc/RF27-7ZKM]. 
 265 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-704 (West 2021) (employing an expansive defini-
tion of taxpayer for state EITC law); Danielle E. Gaines, Earned Income Tax Credit Expansion Quiet-
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 268 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (describing categories for which “[n]o person shall be regarded as, or found 
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compliance with tax laws”); cf. Jimenez v. Gonzales, 158 F. App’x 7, 8 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that 
an immigrant who, in order to work and pay taxes, made up a social security number until he secured 
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 269 Cynthia Blum, Rethinking Tax Compliance of Unauthorized Workers After Immigration Reform, 
21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 603–04 (2007) (describing how undocumented workers’ taxes have influ-
enced the immigration reform debate); Fact Sheet: President Biden Sends Immigration Bill to Congress 
as Part of His Commitment to Modernize Our Immigration System, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-president-
biden-sends-immigration-bill-to-congress-as-part-of-his-commitment-to-modernize-our-immigration-
system/ [https://perma.cc/Z6FW-XCZZ] (describing a proposed bill that provides a roadmap to legal 
status and eventually citizenship for undocumented individuals “if they pass criminal and national 
security background checks and pay their taxes” (emphasis added)). 
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concerned taxpayers otherwise interested in paying.270 Specifically, migrants 
may fear that tax returns with sensitive information will fall into the hands of 
immigration enforcement, despite statutory provisions that should protect tax-
payer information.271 In other words, tax compliance benefits may be dis-
counted by present-day worries about privacy, information sharing, and subse-
quent immigration consequences. 
Tax compliance, although unable to secure emergency relief, may still al-
low undocumented migrants other benefits, including the ability to remain law-
fully in the United States. The prospective gains of a pathway to permanent 
residency and citizenship are both more valuable and less certain than access 
to unfolding local benefits. Remaining in the United States, an outcome that 
acts as a cage for the wealthy, ironically reflects the very freedom that undoc-
umented taxpayers seek. 
IV. THE CONCERNS ABOUT TAX LAW’S MIGRATION 
Tax law’s migration raises concerns, particularly insofar as tax law polic-
es immigration violations. This Part illuminates two significant concerns. First, 
excluding broad classes of migrants from emergency economic relief for which 
they are otherwise ineligible is costly, legally anomalous, and unnecessarily 
restrictive. Second, conscripting federal and state tax authorities to police mi-
grants undermines their primary focus on revenue, which is furthered by im-
migrant tax compliance (as distinct from immigration compliance). 
A number of arguments militate broad immigrant inclusion in emergency 
economic relief. First, because emergency relief is inherently ad hoc and un-
foreseeable, the arguments usually levied against enrollment in safety net pro-
grams are less persuasive.272 Although many scholars extol these programs’ 
individual and social economic payoffs, concerns about “dependency” and 
                                                                                                                           
 270 See, e.g., ACLU Letter, supra note 173, at 1 (noting how “[t]his request reflects recent pro-
posals, reported on in the media, to promote the sharing of information between the Social Security 
Administration (SSA), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)”). 
 271 See supra notes 167–170 and accompanying text. See generally Sarah Lamdan, When Westlaw 
Fuels ICE Surveillance: Legal Ethics in the Era of Big Data Policing, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
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 272 By “emergency economic relief,” I mean isolated payments made in emergency circumstanc-
es, as distinct from regular enrollment in “safety net” programs. See Marianne Bitler, The EITC and 
the Social Safety Net in the Great Recession, 70 TAX L. REV. 533, 538 (2017) (discussing a range of 
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“perverse incentives” inevitably arise.273 Whether or not undocumented immi-
grants remain ineligible for many safety net programs,274 because emergency 
relief is ad hoc, it is not seriously compromised by these dependency and per-
verse incentive arguments. 
Second, emergency assistance often reaches broadly, looking past immi-
gration status. For example, despite exclusion from health programs like Med-
icaid, undocumented immigrants are entitled to emergency medical care under 
federal law,275 for which federal agencies may even encourage uptake.276 Simi-
larly, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides crisis 
counseling, disaster legal services, and non-cash aid, regardless of immigration 
status.277 For those unconvinced of emergency relief for all undocumented 
immigrants, one compromise may be the current status quo, allowing citizen 
children to render their households eligible.278 This compromise would still be 
more inclusive than the initial rounds of pandemic relief, where a citizen child 
could not establish a household’s eligibility.279 The tax system’s distribution of 
                                                                                                                           
 273 Manasi Deshpande, Does Welfare Inhibit Success? The Long-Term Effects of Removing Low-
Income Youth from the Disability Rolls, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 3300, 3300 (2016); cf. David A. Super, 
The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 675 (2004) (describing how particu-
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Thus, beyond general portrayals of public benefits as a “‘hammock’ for lazy recipients,” the second-
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per, supra, at 646 n.54. 
 274 See generally Andrew Hammond, The Immigration-Welfare Nexus in a New Era?, 22 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 501 (2018) (discussing noncitizen exclusions for Medicaid, SNAP, TANF, and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)); Super, supra note 273, at 720 (describing how the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 made many immigrants ineligible 
for several, public entitlement programs). 
 275 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
 276 See Public Charge Resources, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/
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FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20201016/faq-citizenship-status-and-eligibility-disaster-
assistance (Mar. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/RM8F-4K5Z] [hereinafter FAQ]. 
 278 This includes, for example, the Child Tax Credit. 26 U.S.C. § 24(c)(2), (h)(7) (“No credit shall 
be allowed under this section to a taxpayer with respect to any qualifying child unless the taxpayer 
includes the social security number of such child on the return of tax for the taxable year.”). But see 
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“qualifying child,” i.e. one without a Social Security Number). Another example is FEMA cash assis-
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FEMA cash assistance (Individuals and Households Program Assistance) if you live together.”). 
 279 Thus, the first two rounds were more restrictive than the Child Tax Credit. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 24(h)(7) (establishing eligibility based on a child’s Social Security Number). 
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emergency relief should supplement rather than contradict the inclusive as-
pects of our ad hoc health and disaster-relief systems.280 
Relief could plausibly be limited to migrants who previously met their tax 
obligations. This, however, creates similar efficiency tradeoffs in an emergen-
cy. Simpler eligibility criteria allow for speedy transmission of funds to meet 
acute needs quickly.281 Administrative complexity, including by having indi-
viduals submit historic tax returns and demonstrate compliance for some peri-
od, makes the process more challenging and expensive.282 Of course, if tax 
compliance conditions accelerate the political possibility of distributing relief 
more broadly to migrants, that may be a price decision-makers are willing to 
pay. 
Immigrant exclusion is no better justified by fraud concerns.283 Rather, 
state agencies and the Federal Trade Commission focus on fraudulent schemes 
whereby otherwise eligible people “pay” to receive emergency payments or 
reveal personal information to third-parties who fraudulently and preemptively 
steal their payment.284 Fraud concerns are best addressed through inclusive 
consumer protection efforts, not migrant exclusion. 
                                                                                                                           
 280 See Kathleen R. Page, Maya Venkataramani, Chris Beyrer & Sarah Polk, Undocumented U.S. 
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Penalties, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/California-
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billions of dollars of fraudulent payments made through Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, a fed-
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 284 Jennifer Leach, Scams in Between Stimulus Packages, FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER IN-
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Beyond the problems with denying emergency economic relief, tax au-
thorities’ literal policing of migrants undermines their revenue focus.285 Max-
imizing revenue means cultivating migrant tax compliance,286 because the 
primary goal of the IRS and its state analogs is to collect tax revenue.287 Ca-
nonical tax cases establish that one has an independent obligation to pay taxes 
on illegally-derived income, and the failure to do so comprises a distinct legal 
violation from the violation generating the taxable income.288 Partnerships be-
tween the IRS and DHS may undermine taxpayer trust and undocumented im-
migrants’ willingness to pay for fear of information sharing.289 Tax agencies’ 
revenue focus renders them unfit conscripts in immigration enforcement en-
deavors. 
Enforcing tax and immigration law by focusing on individual income tax-
payers or individual migrants is neither the only nor the best option. The 
Treasury Inspector General suggested a more “focused strategy” on employers 
and payroll service providers.290 The Supreme Court similarly emphasized how 
the governing immigration statutes reflect Congress’s intent to focus enforce-
ment on employers rather than individual immigrant employees.291 To the ex-
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 291 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 406 (2012) (concluding that “[t]he correct instruction 
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ate to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment”); Kati L. 
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tent that tax authorities intersect with immigration, their resources may be 
most effectively deployed on employers’ nonpayment of employment taxes, 
rather than expulsion of their undocumented workers.292 The IRS’s efforts in 
Zelaya began appropriately by focusing on institutional violators, but some-
how permitted an unwise and ultimately unconstitutional instance of mission 
drift. 293 If this is a sign of things to come, we should be concerned. 
Despite these issues, tax law’s migration is not wholly flawed. I take a 
more agnostic approach to the second facet of the phenomenon. Migration and 
mobility rights are used to police often affluent citizens’ tax compliance, 
though the less well-heeled and more sympathetic are occasionally caught in 
the crosshairs.294 This second facet of tax law’s migration may ultimately cre-
ate problems of its own through the marketplaces for citizenship and residency, 
but it is less normatively troubling.295 Nor does the consideration of migrants’ 
tax compliance—a common part of comprehensive immigration reforms—
raise similar concerns.296 Tax compliance as a basis for eligibility for lawful 
residency is more sensible than the familiarly worded but questionably capri-
cious “criminal” exclusions.297 In sum, even if attaching migration and mobili-
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ty consequences to tax compliance raises issues, they should not distract from 
the more severe concerns arising from using tax law to police poor migrants. 
CONCLUSION 
Tax law’s migration persists. Nineteenth-century cases force us to con-
front instances of this intersection, but the longer arc, predating the Passenger 
Cases and reaching to the current moment, remains underappreciated. From 
that inadequate appreciation comes a lack of concern for tax law’s policing of 
poor migrants, whether via an absence of tax-based relief or via armed officers. 
Tax law regulates the mobility of wealthy, tax-cheating citizens, who re-
main precious to the American community. Tax law also removes and punishes 
the undocumented, focusing on their immigration law noncompliance above 
any tax law compliance. Distinct circumstances give rise to varying re-
strictions, forbidding some delinquent taxpayers from leaving temporarily, 
while banishing others permanently.298 
We should remain vigilant of how tax law’s migration blurs the bounda-
ries between the debts we nominally owe and the rights we hold fundamental. 
In particular, we should not allow poor migrants, who too often feel indebted, 
to believe that their minimal inclusion is unaffordable. 
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